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BRUCE R. HUBER* 
ABSTRACT 
Ownership is commonly regarded as a powerful tool for environmental 
protection and an essential solution to the tragedy of the commons. But 
conventional property analysis downplays the possibility of negative-value 
property, a category which includes contaminated, depleted, or derelict 
sites. Owners have little incentive to retain or restore negative-value 
property and much incentive to alienate it. Although the law formally 
prohibits the abandonment of real property, avenues remain by which 
owners may functionally abandon negative-value property, as 
demonstrated recently by busts in certain coal and oil & gas markets. When 
negative-value property is abandoned, whether formally or functionally, the 
rehabilitation of such property typically requires public expenditure—an 
externality which cuts against property’s general and salutary tendency to 
internalize spillovers at a low social cost. The existence of negative-value 
property, as well as its increasing abundance, reveals an underdeveloped 
aspect of property theory and a pressing need to fortify legal mechanisms 
that prevent abandonment and enforce owners’ financial responsibility for 
severely degraded property.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Property rights are often regarded as a boon for environmental protection 
and the conservation of natural resources.1 By linking owners to assets, 
property law incentivizes owners to preserve and protect those assets.2 
Imposing ownership on unowned domains can thus help prevent wasteful 
tragedies of the commons.3 And perhaps best of all, property law is largely 
 
1. Some approaches go so far as to place private resource ownership at the very center of 
environmental policy. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991) (advocating broadly for increased private land ownership on the premise 
that private owners will steward and conserve land more effectively than government because of owners’ 
interests in maintaining land value). Although most environmental scholars place far more emphasis on 
regulatory efforts, the importance of property institutions to environmental protection is broadly 
recognized. For a comprehensive account, see DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION & PROPERTY: COMPARING 
OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002).  
2. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1368 (1993) (noting 
that “the preeminent advantage of an infinite land interest is that it is a low-transaction cost device for 
inducing a mortal landowner to conserve natural resources for future generations.”). Needless to say, 
there also are ample noneconomic justifications for resource conservation. 
3. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245, 1247 (1968) 













self-effectuating; it does its work with relatively little government 
involvement.4 
This cheery view of property, however, is built on the assumption that 
property will generally maintain a positive value. When property has a 
negative value—as with, say, a parcel contaminated by toxic waste—
everything changes. Many landowners would prefer to abandon such a 
parcel than to rehabilitate it.5  Indeed, vast numbers of contaminated or 
degraded sites, in every American era and locale, have been abandoned by 
their previous owners.6 Lawmakers have enacted extensive legislation and 
created elaborate bureaucracies to clean up such sites and to prevent further 
dereliction in the future. Resource conservation in such instances is 
anything but self-effectuating. Enormous public resources, both budgetary 
and bureaucratic, are required at every turn.7 
For the most part, the concept of negative-value property is absent from 
the literature of property law.8 That literature dwells predominantly (and 
appropriately) on law’s treatment of things of positive value, for property 
rights are generally a function of the scarcity of sought-after goods.9 But 
this Article suggests that negative-value property is the dark matter of the 
 
criticized, however, for assuming that owners will not knowingly overexploit resources. See COLE, supra 
note 1, at 16, 85–109. 
4. Governments define and enforce property rights and contracted exchange, but the property 
strategy requires little more from the state precisely because owners are incentivized to monitor and 
protect their holdings themselves. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1327–1330; see also Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354–57 (1967) (noting that individual 
land ownership reduces vastly the costs of negotiation over externalities). 
5. As will be discussed herein, the abandonment of title to land is formally disallowed, though 
functionally possible. See, e.g., Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995). 
6. See infra Part II. The COVID-19 pandemic may accelerate abandonment in certain areas of 
economic life. See, e.g., Heather Richards, Coronavirus Could Drive ‘Mass Abandonment’ of Oil Wells, 
E&E NEWS (May 5, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063049965 [https://perma.cc/3MHE-RA5 
X]. 
7. As only one example, the GAO has reported that from 1998 to 2007, four federal agencies 
spent no less than $2.6 billion to reclaim abandoned hardrock mines. ROBIN M. NAZZARO, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-574T, HARDROCK MINING: INFORMATION ON ABANDONED MINES 
AND VALUE AND COVERAGE OF FINANCIAL ASSURANCES ON BLM LAND 9 (2008). 
8. References to negative-value property are uncommon, although the concept has appeared in 
several recent articles. See Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1325, 1332 (2014) 
(addressing the law of unwanted ownership, with frequent references to property with an objectively 
negative value); Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 440–42 (2014) (arguing that 
the existence of negative-value property—exemplified by stagnant real estate listings in Detroit offering 
properties for one dollar—implies a set of affirmative duties to maintain property); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 405–07 (2010) (discussing the right to 
abandon negative-value personal property). 
9. Although ownership today serves as the basis for various social obligations (e.g., the payment 
of taxes), the language of property generally emphasizes rights and entitlements rather than duties. Cf. 
Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A 
Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009) (urging an augmentation of the 
conventional conception of property to incorporate a broad range of social values). 











property universe.10 We are surrounded by it. Negative-value property is 
property which not only has no positive market value, but which cannot 
practically be alienated or discarded without improving it, bundling it with 
other property, or making an additional side payment.11  As to personal 
property, the category is enormous. Within your place of residence—if not 
within your immediate reach—there are almost certainly items which you 
would rather not own; which would attract no willing buyer; and the 
disposal of which will require your time, your money, or both. Such 
property is likely only a minor annoyance to you, but in the aggregate, it 
represents a problem that is far from trivial: great effort is invested into 
creating and enforcing policies that divert such property from, say, 
roadsides and open spaces (“No Dumping!”) and towards landfills, 
recycling facilities, or other users.12 
As to real property, the category of negative-value property is less 
obvious but just as important, and it is here that this Article principally 
dwells. Examples include lands that are contaminated or that otherwise 
carry binding liabilities in excess of any residual positive market value. 
Toxic waste sites, depleted and unreclaimed mines, defunct landfills, and 
unplugged and unproductive oil and gas wells often fit this description.13 
No less conspicuous are properties with derelict or dangerous structures, 
such as obsolete plants that cannot economically be converted for other 
uses. For example, many decommissioned power plants are characterized 
by serious contamination risks, deteriorating structures, and a range of 
ongoing liabilities that exceed any residual site value.14 Absent complicated 
 
10. Scientists posit the existence of invisible “dark matter” to account for observations 
suggesting that the universe has a great deal more mass than can be visually observed. Some leading 
cosmological models hypothesize that dark matter may constitute the majority of the total mass of the 
universe. See generally Lee Billings, In the Dark About Dark Matter, SCI. AM., Oct. 1, 2016, at 15. 
11. Negative value property is to be distinguished both from zero-value property and from 
positive-value property that is nonetheless highly illiquid because of transaction or search costs. 
Abandonment of such property generally does not impose serious economic or environmental burdens 
upon society. Although property values fluctuate and are often difficult to ascertain, this Article’s focus 
is on property with a discernible, stable, and substantial negative value.  
12. Perhaps the most interesting of such efforts are those that attempt to reduce the usually 
prohibitive transaction and search costs associated with the transfer of unique or illiquid goods. Craigslist 
and eBay are the best-known, allowing owners to easily broadcast to mass audiences the availability of 
even low-value items that might otherwise be disposed. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 8, at 356–57 
(describing “free stuff” listings on Craigslist).  
13. Often, but by no means always: many such sites have a net positive value despite their 
liabilities, cleanup costs, or both. See, e.g., Josh Jacobs, Europe’s Half a Million Landfill Sites 
Potentially Worth a Fortune, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/0bf645dc-d8f1-11e 
7-9504-59efdb70e12f [https://perma.cc/N66N-EBKK]. 
14. Some such facilities will require active monitoring and management far into the future. See 
generally DANIEL RAIMI, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DECOMMISSIONING US POWER PLANTS: 












legal interventions, or a wild swing in market conditions, no buyer is likely 
to appear for such properties. 
The danger of negative-value real property is that those who damage or 
contaminate land may be unable to restore it or may walk away from it, 
leaving it to others to clean up their mess.15 Formally, the law does not 
readily allow such abandonment;16 indeed, modern law often requires firms 
to post bonds or otherwise assure the government that they are capable of 
bearing the potential costs of cleanup associated with their enterprises.17 But 
such policies are far from foolproof. To the contrary, owners display 
boundless creativity in finding ways to evade or diminish cleanup 
requirements. Sometimes their tactics simply delay the performance of 
cleanup obligations.18  In many instances, however, owners escape such 
obligations altogether via a kind of functional abandonment, leaving 
taxpayers on the hook for the restoration of negative-value property.19 Each 
year, billions of taxpayer dollars are spent cleaning up contaminated or 
abandoned sites.20 There are public funds to pay for abandoned mines,21 
abandoned oil wells,22 abandoned underground storage tanks,23 abandoned 
waste sites,24 and much else—not to mention the vast public funds devoted 
to more generic brownfield redevelopment.25 
 
15. At least, this is the danger associated with negative-value real estate in private ownership. 
There is a great deal of negative-value land in public ownership also, and the principal danger here is 
analogous: that government actors will foist cleanup costs onto future taxpayers, and not themselves 
bear the costs of harmful activities. 
16. The most developed discussion of this issue can be found in Strahilevitz, supra note 8, and a 
response by Professor Peñalver. Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 191 (2010). 
17. See generally James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are 
Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise? (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 01-
42, 2001). 
18. Delays benefit responsible parties by virtue of discounting. See, e.g., Gordon C. Rausser, Leo 
K. Simon & Jinhua Zhao, Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties, and Cleanup Delays at Superfund 
Sites, 35 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 48, 49 (1998) (noting that the substantial cost savings provided by 
discounting can incentivize parties to delay cleanup). 
19. Examples of functional abandonment are described in Part II, infra. 
20. See, e.g., ROBIN M. NAZZARO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 7 (describing 
the estimated $2.6 billion federal agencies spent over nearly a decade to reclaim abandoned hardrock 
mines). 
21. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (creating the “Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund”). 
22. Every oil and gas producing state has a program to address orphaned and abandoned wells. 
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-192(a) (2019) (establishing the “abandoned oil and gas well fund”). 
23. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 9508(a) (creating the “Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust 
Fund”). 
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 9507 (creating the “Superfund” to pay for, inter alia, abandoned hazardous 
waste disposal sites). 
25. Brownfield land is land which has been previously developed but is presently not in use, or 
for which redevelopment is complicated, due to concerns about land contamination. Such land is not 
necessarily abandoned, yet its owner may lack the wherewithal to clean or develop it. Absent publicly 
 











These public payments represent an important and often overlooked 
externality—a kind of temporal spillover, an externality foisted across time 
rather than space.26 Permanent land ownership is commonly thought to keep 
the incidence of temporal spillovers to a minimum,27 and in many instances 
it may indeed do so, at least when the value of land is positive. But 
humankind’s ability to create lasting harms to land has increased 
exponentially over the last century.28 When land is seriously degraded, the 
incentive to abandon replaces the incentive to conserve. In land use sectors 
regularly associated with negative-value property, we should expect to see 
sophisticated efforts to abandon land and liability, and as such efforts 
succeed, we should expect a further decline in other similarly situated 
owners’ efforts to maintain positive land values. 29  In these sectors, 
permanent land ownership, standing alone, predictably fails to deliver on its 
promise of resource conservation. Moreover, the bulk of the public 
expenditure required to address negative-value property lies ahead of us, not 
behind. Our nation’s most vexing decommissioning and cleanup efforts—
those involving offshore oil rigs or nuclear power plants, for example—are 
 
funded remediation, much brownfield land is negative-value property. There are myriad brownfield 
redevelopment programs at the state and federal level. For an overview, see Types of EPA Brownfield 
Grant Funding, EPA (last updated Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/types-brownfields 
-grant-funding [https://perma.cc/9HA3-KNLC]. 
26. See generally Bruce R. Huber, Temporal Spillovers, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 43–57 (Klaus Mathis & Bruce R. Huber eds., 2017). Most externalities are conceived in 
spatial terms, where an activity in one parcel affects parties elsewhere (as with air pollution from a 
factory, for example). Temporal externalities, by contrast, manifest only after the passage of time and 
may affect later owners of the same parcel (as when an owner discovers hidden waste, attributable to a 
prior owner, yet lacks recourse against that owner). Temporal spillovers do not feature prominently in 
the literature. Exceptions include Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 
1468–70 (2016) (noting that the current structure of property law addresses temporal spillovers at the 
expense of other externalities that now typify urban land use); Sarah Jacobson, Temporal Spillovers in 
Land Conservation, 107 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 366 (2014) (modeling post-contract externalities 
associated with the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program); and Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State 
of Nature Theory, and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 7–10 (2009) (discussing 
the relationship between security of possession and “temporal externalities”). 
27. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 26, at 1479–82. Fennell recognizes that temporal spillovers are 
not “perfectly solved even by the fee simple” as when owners “avoid taking responsibility for negative-
value properties.” Id. at 1482.  
28. An enormous literature could be cited here. Rachel Carson’s SILENT SPRING (1962), for 
example, was one of the first (and remains one of the most famous) scientific works to discuss at length 
the alarming emergent environmental ills that often accompany technological development. The book 
focuses on the harms associated with synthetic pesticides in general and DDT in particular. 
29. There remain strong moral, legal, and environmental rationales for land conservation. Some 
owners of negative-value property are motivated to rehabilitate it, and of these, some have the means to 
carry it out. The emphasis of this Article, however, is on the economic incentives created by negative-













in their infancy.30 The track record of government, in the many regulatory 
programs established to manage site closure and land restoration, is not 
encouraging.31 It is possible that, with sufficient political will, lawmakers 
could design and implement more effective rules. But the broader lesson is 
that negative-value property is endemic to American property law and the 
incentives it creates. It is, so to speak, a bug in the system, and not one that 
can be easily corrected. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I will provide some theoretical 
background in order to explain why negative-value property is important to 
property theory. Part II describes the extent of negative-value property (and 
the policies developed to address it) across various domains and lays out a 
set of examples to provide fodder for the analysis that follows. Although 
numerous examples are provided, the discussion focuses at length on recent 
busts in the coal and oil and gas sectors, since these busts allow a close 
inspection of very recent tactics employed by owners of negative-value 
property. Part III then moves into analysis, drawing out recurrent legal, 
political, and economic dynamics in the treatment of negative-value 
property, and positing some paths forward. The Article ends with a brief 
Conclusion.  
I. A BRIEF THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Why is negative-value property important? This Part aims to locate the 
concept of negative-value property in property theory. In short, the current 
literature places substantial weight on property’s tendency to direct owners’ 
incentives towards resource conservation, but it seldom discusses the 
temporal spillovers that arise in connection with negative-value property. 
Part II will examine the incidence of such spillovers, but for the moment, 
the crucial point is that they cut against the incentive to conserve land. Let’s 
explore this. 
A core function of property law is to protect rights to scarce and desirable 
things. Our intuitions about ownership, visible from the moment a child 
cries “mine!” over a favorite toy, tend to match the Blackstonian picture of 
“sole and despotic dominion” exercised over physical things, “in total 
 
30. See Boyd, supra note 17, at 67 (“[I]t should be noted that many of the most significant 
environmental obligations guaranteed by assurance mechanisms have yet to come due. Long-tailed 
hazards associated with landfills, for example, will not reveal themselves for decades.”). Of the U.S. 
fleet of nuclear power plants, only ten have been successfully decommissioned. Marta M. Gospodarczyk 
& Jacob Kincer, Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors Is a Long-Term and Costly Process, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY, (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=3 
3792 [https://perma.cc/9T6P-YAS7]. 
31. See infra Part II. 











exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”32 To own 
something is to do with it as one pleases. Property law puts the power of the 
state behind this understanding. In a common law system, the task of 
property law is to develop and refine the appropriate bases for and 
parameters of property rights—to sort out illegitimate claims from 
legitimate ones, and then to stand ready to protect justified possession. 
Yet there is much more to the logic of property than merely protecting 
settled rights to possession. Harold Demsetz famously posited that “[a] 
primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve 
a greater internalization of externalities.”33 In contemporary usage, we often 
assume externalities to be negative, but here Demsetz had in mind positive 
externalities as well. Property rights will tend to emerge, Demsetz argued, 
when the gains from internalization exceed the costs.34  In his example, 
aboriginals on the Labrador Peninsula recognized private rights to land 
when the exploding fur trade made it worth their while to do so. Property 
rights allowed them to capture (internalize) the benefits of husbanding fur-
bearing animals, thus addressing what would otherwise have been a 
deleterious externality: the overhunting of those animals that would have 
resulted if hunting families could not exclude others from their territory.35  
Building on Demsetz, many other scholars have expanded upon the 
benefits of this internalization function of property rights, explaining why it 
reduces harmful land uses and encourages beneficial ones.36 As to the latter, 
property rights allow owners to capture the benefits of improvements to land 
or resources that would otherwise be lost, so long as the scale of the right 
encompasses the scale of the improvement in both space and time. 37 
Landowners who feel secure in the permanence of their rights, across 
sufficient space and time, will be more likely to steward their property 
carefully for their own benefit, and perhaps even for the benefit of their 
offspring or successors in interest.38 This feature of property rights has led 
 
32. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2. 
33. Demsetz, supra note 4, at 348.  
34. Id. at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of 
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”). 
35. Id. at 351–53. The same economic logic was described also by Blackstone, who noted that 
“no man would be at the trouble to provide either [habitation or raiment], so long as he had only an 
usufructuary property in them, which was to cease the instant that he quitted possession.” BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 31, at *4. Similar reasoning is at work in arguments positing property rights as a solution to 
tragedies of the commons. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating 
Private Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 444 (1981) (arguing that private ownership leads to 
sustainable yields, whereas public ownership leads to overuse and depletion). 
36. See generally Ellickson, supra note 2; Richard A. Epstein, supra note 26; Carol M. Rose, 
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81–82 (1985). 
37. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1323–32.  
38. Id. at 1369 (noting that perpetual property rights induce even elderly and self-interested 












many to regard private ownership as a critical component of an 
environmental protection policy.39  
As to harmful uses of land, economic logic suggests that property rights 
reduce their incidence in several respects. If an owner’s use of a parcel 
adversely affects that parcel, the owner suffers the consequences by way of 
the diminished market value of the parcel. If the adverse effects spread 
beyond the immediate parcel, individual property rights will help to mitigate 
even those effects, because individual ownership reduces the transaction 
costs involved in negotiating a solution.40 When property rights are weak, 
communal, or ill-defined, an adversely affected landowner may have to 
negotiate with many parties to extinguish an unwanted externality, if it is 
even possible at all. But when an adverse effect can be clearly attributed to 
the land use of a single owner, the difficulty of negotiation is vastly reduced 
and the parties are more likely to agree to a mutually preferable 
arrangement.41  
So far, so good: property rights help guide owners’ incentives towards 
land stewardship and resource conservation, and even help address the 
instances in which harms cross from one plot of land to another. This 
understanding may match our experience and intuition for a range of 
modern land uses. But are there categories of property for which owners’ 
incentives are different than those suggested thus far?  
Consider a rural land parcel, abundant in some valuable mineral resource 
yet otherwise unremarkable in its location and setting. For such a parcel, the 
value of the resource (separated from the land) may well dwarf any residual 
value of the land without the resource. An owner could rationally choose to 
extract and sell the resource, leaving the land in a damaged and unsaleable 
(i.e. negative-value) condition. 42  In most jurisdictions today, of course, 
mineral extraction activities are regulated: rules would likely exist both to 
direct the extractive process and to establish standards for the reclamation 
of the land after extraction. These rules are necessary precisely because 
economic incentives alone would not likely guide owners towards long-
 
39. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 26; COLE, supra note 1; ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1; cf. 
Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. 
& ECON. 163, 176–78 (1975) (describing the changing regulation of water in the west in response to 
western water scarcity). 
40. See Demsetz, supra note 4, at 349, 356–57. Here Demsetz is obviously building upon Ronald 
Coase’s famous article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and its emergent theory 
of transaction cost economics. Demsetz, supra note 4, at 349 n.1. 
41. Demsetz, supra note 4, at 356–57; see Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1327–30. 
42. For those unfamiliar with the long-term land harms associated with mining activity, they will 
be summarized in Part II, infra. For the moment, suffice it to say that mined land generally requires 
significant post-closure treatment and remediation in order to be made usable for other purposes. 











term land care, at least for nonrenewable resources.43 Yet even with such 
regulations in place, we would not be surprised to find that owners’ 
decisions are shaped far more by the resource market than by the market for 
the depleted land. The latter may be little more than a rounding error as 
compared to the former. 
Keeping this example in mind, let us look again at a leading and now-
conventional view of property rights, using Yale law professor Robert 
Ellickson as our guide. In a memorable passage in one of his leading articles, 
Ellickson writes: 
 Although the assertion may seem counterintuitive, the key to land 
conservation is to bestow upon living persons property rights that 
extend perpetually into the future. The current market value of a fee 
in Blackacre is the discounted present value of the eternal stream of 
rights and duties that attach to Blackacre. A rational and self-
interested fee owner therefore adopts an infinite planning horizon 
when considering how to use his parcel, and is spurred to install cost-
justified permanent improvements and to avoid premature 
exploitation of resources. The fee simple in land cleverly harnesses 
human selfishness to the cause of altruism toward the unborn, a group 
not noted for its political clout or bargaining power. 
 An illustration may help convince the skeptical. Suppose that 
Mae, a selfish 80-year-old without a bequest motive, owns a house in 
the Hollywood Hills in fee simple. Mae is considering installing a 
screening room that would last, with luck, for centuries. In making 
her decision, would Mae consider the room’s benefits that would 
accrue after her death? . . . She might well be able to find a younger 
buyer, such as Rock, who could enjoy the screening room for several 
decades. When considering the purchase, Rock would recognize that 
this room would be a sales asset when it came time for him to unload 
the house, say to Demi (someone still younger). . . . In short, benefits 
and costs from here to eternity are capitalized into Rock’s bid.44 
 
43. Indeed, many such rules were imposed after resource booms had played out, and legislators 
became aware of their consequences. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 960–
63, 976 (Pa. 2013); Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916–19 (Pa. 2017) (both 
cases together describe the harmful effects of coal, oil, and gas extraction in Pennsylvania and the 
environmental legislation that resulted). 
Many have noted that secure, permanent rights to renewable resources, such as timber, incentivize 
owners to harvest those resources in such a way as to protect and enhance renewal of the resource. See, 
e.g., Epstein supra note 26, at 10 (noting that “[c]ommercial firms have a built-in incentive to clear-cut 
on public lands because they do not own the long-term interest and any reduction in land value falls on 
the public at large”). 












All true. But if we substitute a copper lode for the Hollywood Hills home, 
and a mining operation for the screening room, the outcome may not so 
easily be described as “altruistic toward the unborn.” 45  The owner’s 
incentives point to land depletion, not land protection. If the value of the 
depleted land approaches the value of the copper, perhaps Ellickson’s logic 
will hold, but as those values diverge, land conservation may well be 
sacrificed for resource revenue.46 In other words, if there is a good chance 
that the mined land will be valuable after mining is complete, we would 
expect the owner to “install cost-justified permanent improvements”47 and 
otherwise take steps to protect or enhance the land’s value. But if the owner 
expects the land to have a negative-value—that is, if the damage is such that 
the expected cost of reclamation exceeds the estimated land value after 
reclamation—he or she will be unlikely to regard reclamation as cost-
justified.  
For mineral lands, then, we see a somewhat different logic at work than 
that depicted by Demsetz and Ellickson. The incentives created by the mere 
fact of perpetual private ownership, standing alone, seem less likely to lead 
to long-term land conservation or resource protection. Regulation or some 
other external social force will probably be required to induce an owner to 
rehabilitate mined land. In fact, some external force may be necessary even 
to prevent the owner from abandoning such land. Not only does ownership 
fail to induce land conservation; the resource extraction motive actually cuts 
against long-term ownership. A rational owner would abandon the depleted 
property if allowed to do so—and, as Part II will explore, rational actors did 
and continue to do precisely this. If the land effectively has no residual 
value, any incentive to continue owning that land expires upon the 
exhaustion of its mineral supply. 
When land is abandoned, the costs of its rehabilitation are externalized. 
Any remediation that occurs will be at the expense of some future owner or 
manager, someone other than the party responsible for the damage. 
Throughout American history, abandoned lands—resource extraction sites 
in particular—have necessitated enormous public expenditures.48 These are 
not spatial externalities, but temporal ones. The potential for severe 
temporal externalities of this sort highlights the importance of rules against 
 
45. Id. 
46. The efficient timing of resource extraction and sale—i.e., how an owner can maximize 
resource revenue—is a separate and complicated issue that has interested economists at least since 
Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137 (1931).  
47. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1369. 
48. See supra notes 7, 21–24.  











abandonment. Such rules are a first-cut and relatively low-cost way of trying 
to keep landowners “on the hook” for repairing damage to land.49  
By themselves, rules against abandonment do little to incentivize an 
owner to pursue land remediation. An owner of an exhausted mine, barred 
from abandoning that land, could simply choose to hold the land indefinitely 
without ever cleaning it up. Although the land may represent an ongoing 
liability to its owner (say, by way of tax obligations or potential tort claims), 
the owner may nonetheless find that her exposure is far less than the cost of 
cleanup.50 So why not simply hold the land into perpetuity?51 
To assure the remediation of land in such a scenario, something more is 
needed than unaided property rights and a rule against abandonment.52 
Many jurisdictions have concluded that only an affirmative obligation 
imposed by public law will get the job done. Note that when such 
obligations exist, we can more robustly employ the label of negative-value 
property: land that can be abandoned, or simply held indefinitely without 
remediation, might be considered zero-value rather than negative-value. But 
land that carries binding, enforceable legal obligations, in excess of its 
expected value after cleanup, can only be considered negative-value. No 
market will exist for such land. 
The imposition of affirmative cleanup duties, which is now 
commonplace in a variety of land use contexts, creates several noteworthy 
dynamics. First, note that reclamation duties may actually increase the 
 
49. For a discussion of the rationale behind rules against abandonment, see Peñalver, supra note 
16. Although the common law typically allows the abandonment of chattels, Peñalver notes that this 
right is “highly qualified, almost to the point of irrelevance,” by the prohibition of the abandonment of 
land. Id. at 206. This is because one seeking to abandon chattels must find someone willing to accept 
them. Id. The bar against land abandonment, in turn, finds its roots in the law’s reluctance to allow 
landowners to evade the duties of ownership. Id. at 208–14. Although certain interests in land can 
lawfully be abandoned, such interests “are carefully defined to exclude affirmative obligations.” Id. at 
200. 
50. Again, there is a great deal of evidence that this is often the case, based on actual landowner 
behavior. See infra Part II. 
51. Even if the owner intends to pursue cleanup at some point, delay reduces the present value 
of cleanup—possibly to a substantial degree. See FRANÇOIS LÉVÊQUE, THE ECONOMICS AND 
UNCERTAINTIES OF NUCLEAR POWER 23–34 (2015) (noting that the discounted cost of nuclear power 
plant decommissioning pales in comparison to construction costs, due to the long time horizon). The 
deferral of an expenditure alone reduces the present value of that expenditure simply by way of 
discounting, but it is also possible that new technologies will emerge that could reduce the cost even 
further. Of course, these possible reductions must be considered against factors cutting in the opposite 
direction: cleanup costs may rise if the harm spreads or increases, or if cleanup standards are tightened. 
See infra Section IV.B. 
52. The claim here is not that land remediation is necessarily desirable or cost-effective in every 
circumstance, let alone that laws requiring cleanup are always normatively desirable. One might argue, 
for example, that market forces will ultimately induce landowners to rehabilitate land once the benefits 
from doing so exceed the costs. Perhaps it is inefficient to require an owner to rehabilitate land before 
sufficient demand exists for that land. For now, the point is merely that if a polity seeks to ensure that 












incentive to abandon. Without such obligations, owners may be content to 
simply hold land indefinitely as noted above. Thus, as we will see, 
reclamation laws are undergirded by rules against abandonment and stress 
the importance of such rules. Second, cleanup obligations, if well enforced, 
can in theory incentivize owners to make cost-effective improvements to 
the extraction process (and land use practices in general) in order to reduce 
the total cost of compliance. If landowners expect to be able to abandon land 
or otherwise shirk these obligations, that incentive disappears; if they expect 
to be able to delay the obligations significantly, that incentive is diminished. 
What we might expect to see, then, is sophisticated efforts to abandon or 
alienate damaged land or, failing this, to postpone cleanup obligations as 
long as possible. Part II will offer some evidence that these efforts are in 
fact widespread. 
Notice how far we have come. The conventional view regards ownership 
of property as an inducement to conservation. Yet for at least some types of 
land, we see that ownership alone does not incentivize conservation and that 
without positive legal obligations, owners could rationally conclude that 
conservation measures are not cost-effective. This is not to say that the 
conventional view is incorrect; its logic undoubtedly holds for a great many 
ownership scenarios. The point is simply that the conventional view directs 
our attention away from the temporal spillovers that arise in connection with 
negative-value property. As Lee Anne Fennell has noted, property law 
“simply ignores many positive and negative externalities. This is as it should 
be; internalizing externalities is costly, and not always worth doing.”53 So 
in order to assess this dimension of property law—to understand whether 
internalizing temporal externalities is “worth doing”—we need to 
understand better the incidence of negative-value property, the magnitude 
of the accompanying spillovers, and the cost of internalizing them. To this 
assessment we now turn. 
II. EXAMPLES OF NEGATIVE-VALUE PROPERTY  
This section will examine several paradigmatic categories of negative-
value property. Before we launch into specific examples, a brief 
clarification is in order. We have said that negative-value property is 
property which has no positive market value, and which cannot practically 
be alienated or discarded without improvement or a side payment of money 
or other property. But assessing property’s economic value is a tricky 
business for a number of reasons. The task of valuation often depends on 
subjective assessments: as the saying goes, one man’s trash is another man’s 
 
53. Fennell, supra note 26, at 1467. 











treasure. And values change. Today’s trash might well be tomorrow’s 
treasure.54 It is also worth noting that value depends on size and scale. 
Specific valuations are inextricably linked to specific demarcations of 
property’s boundaries, whether such boundaries are spatial or temporal, 
surface or subsurface, physical or abstract. An abandoned, negative-value 
mine, for example, might be “hiding” within a larger, positive-value 
parcel.55 
These difficulties will be confronted directly in Part III. For now, this 
Part will simply provide examples in which the law imposes sizeable 
liabilities or duties on landowners—obligations that, over an extended time, 
are likely to exceed whatever residual value a unit of land would bear 
without them.56 It is in such instances that the danger of costly externalities 
looms largest. As we will see, there are numerous cases of this sort, more 
than enough to warrant our attention, quite apart from whatever other 
examples one might find among closer or more ambiguous cases.  
What are the principal types of negative-value property? The most 
obvious includes sites contaminated by toxic waste or other dangerous 
materials. Two other and somewhat related forms of negative-value real 
property are also of extraordinary public policy concern. First, as suggested 
by the previous section, many negative-value properties are sites where 
natural resource deposits have been extracted. Though some resources can 
be extracted without leaving behind long-term land harms—timber, for 
example57—many other resource extraction sites are unusable for other 
purposes without extensive remediation. The second category consists of 
derelict structures: retired power plants, industrial sites, or other facilities 
that have high cleanup and dismantling costs but low salvage and site value. 
 
54. For example, coalbed methane was regarded as a noxious and dangerous byproduct of coal 
mining until methods were developed to capture and market it as fuel. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute 
Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 875–77 (1999). Many now regard landfills, and especially those containing 
electronic waste, as an important source of certain metals. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 13. 
55. Indeed, as we will soon see, negative-value property is often bundled with positive-value 
property to create a single, positive-value unit. This is an important mechanism for addressing negative-
value property. 
56. In several instances in this section, the reader will note that the relevant property is not yet 
negative-value, but is likely to become so in the near future. For example, a mine may retain a positive 
value before it has been substantially depleted, even if its cleanup obligations will probably render it 
negative-value property upon closure. Examples of this sort are included here to give a better sense of 
the scale of the problem of negative-value property. 
57. Modern silvicultural practices do not typically create durable land harms of the sort that lead 
to extensive liability. Renewable resource sites in general retain a positive value due to the inevitability 
of resource renewal. Nonetheless, cut-over timberland land may be unwanted in the short term. During 
westward expansion, for example, it was not uncommon for owners to allow forested property to revert 
to state ownership for nonpayment of property taxes. See generally F.P. Struhsaker, Land Use Problems 
in Michigan, 21 J. FARM ECON. 287 (1939) (describing economic difficulties in Michigan associated 












This section discusses these categories. It focuses most thoroughly on 
two specific forms of negative-value property: depleted coal mines and 
idled oil and gas wells. The reason for this focus is that segments of both 
the coal and the oil and gas industry have suffered recent economic 
downturns. These market busts make it possible to examine closely, under 
the light of current law, the strategies that businesses and landowners 
employed to deal with negative-value property during troubled times. The 
remaining examples will be described in less detail.58 Finally, the section 
will end with a brief word about negative-value personal property.  
A. Depleted Resource Extraction Sites 
Just outside Butte, Montana—a town once dubbed “the richest hill on 
earth” 59 —sits a defunct pit mine called the Berkeley Pit. For those 
unfamiliar with modern pit mining operations, the Pit’s scale is difficult to 
comprehend. One mile wide, a half-mile long, and over a third of a mile 
deep, the Pit yielded millions of tons of copper for its owner, the Anaconda 
Company, between 1954 and the mid-1980s.60 But today, the Pit is filled 
with green-orange water so toxic that multiple systems are in place to 
frighten away birds that might otherwise rest on the water’s surface.61 These 
systems were put in place after 342 migrating snow geese died at the Pit in 
November 1995, their throats burned by the acidic water.62 Groundwater 
has been slowly filling the Pit since 1982, when mining activities ceased 
 
58. Like the initial, lengthier cases, many of these examples are drawn from the energy sector. 
The sector is highly dependent on natural resources; its infrastructure is everywhere; and it is subject to 
sudden changes in markets and technologies. Together, these factors cause negative-value property to 
emerge with regularity, and across a wide geographic area. 
59. Richard I. Gibson, Is Butte Really “The Richest Hill on Earth?” You’d Better Believe It, 
MONT. STANDARD (last updated Feb. 7, 2017), https://mtstandard.com/news/local/is-butte-really-the-ric 
hest-hill-on-earth-youd-better-believe-it/article_3f4fe398-208d-5158-8ed8-29674e4930a1.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/X664-MFKD]. 
60. See generally PIT WATCH, https://pitwatch.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2021) (comprehensive 
website describing the history, science, and current management of the Pit). 
61. A waterfowl mitigation plan, established pursuant to EPA’s oversight of the remediation 
efforts underway at the Berkeley Pit, was approved and finalized in May 1998. Gunfire and electronic 
noisemakers are first used to frighten birds away from the water and a house boat is deployed to “haze” 
any remaining birds. See Season Bird Mitigation Efforts Ongoing, PITWATCH (Jul. 5, 2009), https://pitw 
atch.org/seasonal-bird-mitigation-efforts-ongoing/ [https://perma.cc/GZ7Y-AUX8]. These measures 
are far from foolproof: at least 3,000 geese were killed in the fall of 2016 after a snow storm blew them 
off their typical migration route. At Least 3,000 Geese Killed by Toxic Water from Former Montana 
Copper Mine, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/23/geese-die 
-montana-toxic-mine-epa [https://perma.cc/QL56-DC56]. 
62. Susan Dunlap, Perils of the Pit: 342 Geese Dead After Fateful Landing 20 Years Ago, 
MISSOULIAN (last updated Dec. 1, 2016), https://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/perils-of-the-
pit-342-geese-dead-after-fateful-landing-20-years-ago/article_16b0e55b-d962-5a3c-928f-b88d2f9ea71 
c.html [https://perma.cc/CGQ9-ZQ2N]. 











and operators switched off the pumps that had prevented its inundation.63 
The City of Butte now charges visitors two dollars to take in the spectacle 
from an observation deck, 64  but make no mistake: the Pit is an 
environmental disaster. The water within is roughly as acidic as battery 
acid.65 An extensive water treatment system at the site removes and purifies 
enough of the rising waters to prevent them from overflowing their geologic 
barriers and contaminating local water supplies. 66  The system will be 
required at the Pit forever, or until such time as a different remedial system 
is designed. 
The Berkeley Pit is a prime example of negative-value property. Its 
copper resources exhausted, the site that remains is an extraordinary 
liability. Not only are its maintenance costs sizeable, but the liability 
associated with the failure of the various safety and treatment systems is 
enormous. Importantly, however, the pit has not been abandoned by its 
owner, currently the Atlantic Richfield company.67 The Pit is part of a large 
Superfund site, and the company has entered into consent decrees with the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding the payment of 
cleanup and water treatment costs at the site.68  
The Pit exemplifies an important category of negative-value property. 
Natural resource extraction often entails substantial land degradation. 
Mining activities can entirely reshape an area’s topography and cause a 
wide range of surface damages; oil and gas drilling creates a web of surface 
and subsurface impacts. Extracted resources are often processed at the site 
of extraction, leaving behind a host of unwelcome byproducts. Over the 
years, scores of extraction sites have, unlike the Berkeley Pit, simply been 
abandoned by their operators. 69  The toll of this pattern eventually led 
lawmakers to experiment with policies intended to compel firms to bear 
 
63. Water and the Berkeley Pit, PITWATCH, https://pitwatch.org/water/ [https://perma.cc/2FBG-
58A4]. 
64. Berkeley Pit, MONT., https://www.visitmt.com/listings/general/landmark/berkeley-pit.html 
[https://perma.cc/CKL6-4GV5]. 
65. See generally TIMOTHY J. LECAIN, MASS DESTRUCTION: THE MEN AND GIANT MINES THAT 
WIRED AMERICA AND SCARRED THE PLANET 15–23 (2009). 
66. See Berkeley Pit Superfund, PITWATCH, https://pitwatch.org/superfund/ [https://perma.cc/9 
NVJ-9F96]. 
67. Atlantic Richfield acquired the Pit from the Anaconda Copper Company. See LECAIN, supra 
note 65. 
68. The Pit was added to the Silver Bow Creek Superfund Site in 1987. See 52 Fed. Reg. 27,620, 
27,627 (July 22, 1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also Mine Flooding Consent Decree 
Signed by Federal Judge, PITWATCH (Aug. 13, 2002), https://pitwatch.org/mine-flooding-consent-decre 
e-signed-by-federal-judge/ [https://perma.cc/4A6U-BW3V].  
69. See, e.g., JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 36 
(2005) (“In Montana there are about 20,000 abandoned mines, some of them recent but many of them a 
century or more old, that will be leaking acid and . . . toxic metals essentially forever. The vast majority 
of those mines have no surviving owners to bear financial responsibility, or else the known owners aren’t 












their own cleanup costs. This subsection surveys several examples of 
negative value property arising from resource extraction activities, as well 
as the legal and policy struggles associated with such property.  
1. Surface Coal Mines 
Historically, coal mining was deep mining, taking place in hidden shafts 
penetrating to coal seams far underground.70 But in the mid-1900s, surface 
mining became more economical, and the environmental effects of coal 
mining became more visible and more pronounced.71 As millions of acres 
of American land were stripped and blasted, observers grew concerned that 
mined land would not be restored, especially if the law did not affirmatively 
require it.72  
There are several environmental harms associated with unreclaimed 
surface coal mines. 73  Perhaps the leading concern is a form of water 
pollution known as acid mine drainage (AMD), which occurs when buried 
sulfides are exposed to oxygen and water, creating acidic compounds.74 
AMD is a common problem for mining of any form, but large-scale, 
industrial coal mining techniques introduced in the past half century—such 
as longwall mining, mountaintop removal, and strip mining—are especially 
problematic because they increase exponentially the surface area of rock 
exposed to air and water. AMD is only one of the harms of unreclaimed 
mines; many further problems are caused by the deposition of overburden, 
 
70. See JOEL B. EISEN, EMILY HAMMOND, JIM ROSSI, DAVID B. SPENCE & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, 
ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 106 (5th ed. 2020). 
71. See, e.g., NEAL SHOVER, DONALD A. CLELLAND & JOHN LYNXWILER, ENFORCEMENT OR 
NEGOTIATION: CONSTRUCTING A REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY 17–18 (1986) (noting that surface 
mining accounted for 45% of U.S. coal production in 1970 and 59% by 1980). On the environmental 
effects of coal mining, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Old King Coal and the Merry Rapists of Appalachia, 
22 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 650, 650 (1971) (“Daily, men and machines destroy or entomb thousands of 
acres of soil that took thousands of years to form, leaving behind them barren land and streams poisoned 
by acid running off the mine site.”). 
72. “Despite all reclamation efforts by man and nature, and after the lapse of considerable time, 
about 2 million acres still need additional reclamation work—this is 3,125 square miles, or an area equal 
to the combined land area of the States of Delaware and Rhode Island.” Surface Mining Reclamation: 
Hearings on S. 3132, S. 3126, and S. 217 Before the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affs., 90th Cong. 
37 (1968) (statement of Stuart Udall, Secretary of the Interior), cited in Reitze, supra note 71, at 655.  
73. The basic dangers associated with exposed and unreclaimed mined land were well-known by 
the 1960s. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT: A 
SPECIAL REPORT TO THE NATION (1967); Fred P. Bosselman, The Control of Surface Mining: An 
Exercise in Creative Federalism, 9 NAT. RES. J. 137, 138–44 (1969) (describing the effects of surface 
mining on the environment). 
74. Bosselman, supra note 73, at 140; see also Ata Akcil & Soner Koldas, Acid Mine Drainage 
(AMD): Causes, Treatment and Case Studies, 14 J. CLEANER PROD. 1139 (2006). Note that AMD is a 
naturally-occurring process that results from the mere exposure of rock to air and water.  











the destruction of habitat (such as streams ruined by valley fill operations), 
and soil contamination.75 
By the mid-1900s, it was evident not only that surface coal mining 
caused such problems, but that landowners and mine operators could not be 
relied upon to restore their land after mining operations were complete. A 
prescient economic analysis in 1939 concluded that “[t]he assessed value of 
strip-mined land will eventually be lowered so that local revenues will be 
curtailed and public institutions will suffer or cease to exist. . . . A huge 
reclamation task is created for future citizens to finance from public 
funds.”76 Concerns of this sort led coal-state legislatures to enact a first 
wave of reclamation legislation.77  These statutes were undemanding by 
today’s standards but, burdened by post-mining requirements, many 
exhausted coal mines became negative-value property.78 
Concern over mined land reclamation ultimately led Congress to enact 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) in 1977.79 The 
purpose of SMCRA was to induce coal-producing states to adopt regulatory 
programs at least as stringent as a baseline established by the statute.80 
Under SMCRA, mine operators are required to submit a reclamation plan 
prior to mine opening and to abide by the terms of the plan when 
reclamation takes place.81 Aware that mining firms could become insolvent 
before completing their legal duties, Congress also imposed financial 
assurance requirements to guarantee that funds would be available for 
reclamation if operators did not fulfill their obligations.82 
In theory, financial assurance requirements compel firms to internalize 
the costs of cleanup and protect the public from bearing those costs. 
 
75. Bosselman, supra note 73, at 138–44. 
76. H.W. Hannah & Bert Vandervliet, Effects of Strip Mining on Agricultural Areas in Illinois 
and Suggested Remedial Measures, 15 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 296, 300 (1939). 
77. This legislation typically required mine operators to perform minimal backfilling or 
reclamation upon mine closure. See generally Robert G. Meiners, Strip Mining Legislation, 3 NAT. RES. 
J. 442, 442 (1963) (noting that after West Virginia passed the first such legislation in 1939, five of the 
six other principal coal mining states—Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky—also did 
so between 1941 and 1954).  
78. Early reclamation laws were often not vigorously enforced. SHOVER ET AL., supra note 71, 
at 20. Nonetheless, it became clear that “the costs and returns are not usually such that an outside investor 
would look at strip mine reclamation as an attractive venture.” David B. Brooks, Strip Mine Reclamation 
and Economic Analysis, 6 NAT. RES. J. 13, 28 (1966). 
79. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445(1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1201). 
80. 30 U.S.C. § 1253.  
81. § 1253(a)(1), § 1258 (together mandating that states require reclamation and providing the 
substance of the reclamation plan requirement). 
82. § 1259. These provisions, of course, apply prospectively to future mining applicants. 
SMCRA also addressed existing mines by creating an Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-305, COAL MINE RECLAMATION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES 
FACE CHALLENGES IN MANAGING BILLIONS IN FINANCIAL ASSURANCES 7 n.17 (2018) [hereinafter 
GAO 2018 REPORT]. As of Sept. 30, 2017, the Fund had paid out approximately $3.9 billion, but at least 












SMCRA requires mining applicants to obtain bonds for “faithful 
performance” of reclamation duties, in an amount to be “determined by the 
regulatory authority” and “sufficient to assure the completion of the 
reclamation plan if the work had to be performed by the regulatory authority 
in the event of forfeiture.”83 In a critical examination of the bonding regime, 
a good first question is simply: are regulators setting bond amounts high 
enough to provide adequate funds to clean up abandoned mines? 
It is not hard to find substantial evidence that the answer is no. The coal 
industry has recently experienced a dramatic wave of bankruptcies, 
afflicting even the largest coal producers in the country.84  Amidst this 
financial turmoil, many worried whether existing financial assurances 
would be sufficient to reclaim mined land should the coal firms ultimately 
fail. 85  Members of Congress requested a study on the matter from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO).86 The GAO reported that of the 
450 bond forfeitures in the previous decade, some twenty-two percent “did 
not cover the cost of the required reclamation,” and in another twenty-six 
percent it remains too early to tell if the bond amount will be sufficient.87 
The problem, of course, is obvious and endemic to bond requirements: they 
establish a bond amount before reclamation work is undertaken. If cleanup 
costs were estimated incorrectly or if unanticipated costs arise, it may be too 
late to increase the bond amount or to obtain payment for the additional 
costs.88 It has proven difficult in the extreme for regulators to know with 
precision, before a shovel has broken the earth, how much money will be 
 
83. § 1259(a). 
84. The list of coal producers recently filing for bankruptcy includes all the largest producers in 
the United States: Peabody Energy, Arch Coal, Cloud Peak Energy, and Alpha Natural Resources. See 
generally Daniel Moritz-Rabson, Eleven Coal Companies Have Filed for Bankruptcy Since Trump Took 
Office, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 30, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/eight-coal-companies-have-
filed-bankruptcy-since-trump-took-office-1468734 [https://perma.cc/NDJ3-EJSR]; Mead Gruver, 
Third-Biggest US Coal Company Files for Bankruptcy, ABC NEWS (May 10, 2019, 5:28 PM), https://abc 
news.go.com/US/wireStory/biggest-us-coal-company-files-bankruptcy-62968055 [https://perma.cc/M 
LG3-MLTC]; Arathy S. Nair, Peabody Chapter 11 Tops String of U.S. Coal Bankruptcies, REUTERS 
(Apr. 15, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-coal-bankruptcy/peabody-chapter-11 
-tops-string-of-u-s-coal-bankruptcies-idUSKCN0XC2KQ [https://perma.cc/MVD6-UTZF]. 
85. See, e.g., Editorial, Will Big Coal Pay to Clean Up Its Messes?, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/opinion/will-big-coal-pay-to-clean-up-its-messes.html [https://p 
erma.cc/5EAC-WSX2]; John W. Miller & Dan Frosch, Coal Miners Pressed on Cleanup Costs, WALL 
ST. J. (July 17, 2015, 12:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coal-miners-pressed-on-cleanup-costs-1 
437151107 [https://perma.cc/NMW8-GQQH]. 
86. GAO 2018 REPORT, supra note 82.  
87. Id. at 13. The GAO’s numbers aggregate national data; the problem may be more severe in 
particular locales. The Lexington Field Office of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement (OSMRE), for example, estimated that within the State of Kentucky, “56% of permits did 
not have sufficient bond to reclaim the permit to permanent program standards.” LEXINGTON FIELD 
OFFICE, OSMRE, 2017 ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT 9, www.odocs.osmre.gov [https://perma.cc/A6L 
5-35R6]. 
88. GAO 2018 REPORT, supra note 82, at 24–25. 











required to pay for environmental restoration when a mine closes, decades 
later.89 
Moreover, it has become commonplace for coal producers to avoid 
posting third-party bonds in the first place by way of a loophole called self-
bonding. 90  SMCRA allows state regulators to “accept the bond of the 
[mining permit] applicant itself without separate surety when the applicant 
demonstrates . . . a history of financial solvency and continuous 
operation.”91 The applicant’s “bond” is simply a promise to carry out the 
reclamation plan or pay an equivalent amount.92  So self-bonding is not 
bonding at all, but simply an exemption to the bonding requirement for coal 
producers who are then financially healthy.93 A number of the largest coal 
mining states have chosen to allow self-bonding, including West Virginia, 
Wyoming, Virginia, and Texas.94  
What happens when self-bonded coal producers encounter financial 
difficulties? In theory, regulators could require them to replace self-bonds 
with more secure instruments, but in practice, regulators may not become 
aware of such difficulties until it is too late.95 Financial disclosures may be 
dated or may not reveal the financial peril of a parent corporation or 
subsidiary.96 And SMCRA regulations allow coal producers a full ninety 
days to procure replacement bonds.97 In one recent instance, a major coal 
 
89. For example, many former mining sites require ongoing water pollution management, but 
the duration for which water treatment is required can range from several years to many decades. One 
may assume that regulators improve in their ability to estimate reclamation costs, but the lapse in time 
between the permitting process and mine closure—often between 30–50 years—virtually guarantees 
that remediation practices will change and that regulators’ understanding of the relevant harms will 
evolve. See, e.g., William E. Toffey, Charles R. Miller & L. Douglas Saylor, Two Decades of Mine 
Reclamation: Lessons Learned from One of the Nation’s Largest Biosolids Beneficial Use Programs, ht 
tp://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/subject/advcoun/minrec/Reclamtn.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW6J-GUYF]. 
90. See generally JAYNI FOLEY HEIN, BEN SNOW, SEAN STEFANIK & LAUREN WEBB, INST. FOR 
POL’Y INTEGRITY, SELF-BONDING IN AN ERA OF COAL BANKRUPTCY (2016). 
91. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(c). 
92. Note that a self-bond, like any other bond, is not even a promise to pay the full costs of 
reclamation. It is a commitment to indemnify the regulatory authority for the cost of carrying out the 
reclamation plan, such costs “not to exceed the bond amount.” 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(e)(4). But the bond 
amount is established by the regulator at the time the mine is permitted. See 30 C.F.R. § 800.14. Thus it 
is the regulator, and not the firm, that bears the risk of underestimating the costs of reclamation. 
93. More cynically, it’s also a way of providing a competitive advantage to large, secure firms 
as against smaller upstarts, which may provide a clue as to how this provision gained political support. 
94. GAO 2018 REPORT, supra note 82, at 11–12. 
95. Id. at 20–24. 
96. There is, as is well known, a pervasive informational asymmetry between the firm and the 
regulator; the required disclosures that a firm makes to the regulator mitigate that asymmetry, but only 
imperfectly. “[T]he financial relationships between parent and subsidiary companies have become 
increasingly complex, making it difficult to ascertain an operator’s financial health on the basis of 
information reported in company financial and accounting documents . . . .” Id. at 20.  
97. If a firm’s financial condition changes and the firm ceases to be eligible for self-bonding, 
SMCRA regulations require the firm to notify the regulator immediately. The firm then has 90 days to 












producer filed for bankruptcy even before the ninety-day period had 
elapsed, and without obtaining replacement bonds.98 
There is also a more pervasive logic at work that reduces the incentive 
of even the most stringent regulator to demand replacement bonds. When a 
coal firm falls upon truly hard times, the regulator may fear that imposing 
the cost of external bonds on the firm will drive it out of business entirely, 
leaving the regulator with even less money for reclamation than might 
otherwise remain.99 Regulators need mines to remain operative in order to 
generate revenue for reclamation; requiring bonds diminishes this revenue. 
This makes it difficult for regulators to demand financial assurances at the 
very moment they are most needed, and thus undermines the very purpose 
and effectiveness of the bonding requirement. 
A formal bankruptcy filing exacerbates these patterns. In a pathbreaking 
recent article, Joshua Macey and Jackson Salovaara describe how coal 
producers have exploited the bankruptcy process in recent years to evade 
reclamation and other regulatory obligations. 100  These researchers 
undertook a painstaking analysis of the bankruptcy documents filed by 
Patriot Coal, Peabody, Arch Coal, and Alpha Natural Resources—four of 
the largest U.S. coal producers, each of which has filed for bankruptcy since 
2015. 101  These records demonstrate that coal firms used their financial 
distress as a negotiating point in discussions with state regulators, well 
aware that regulators ultimately depend on the firms’ survival for 
reclamation to occur. In several instances, coal firms explicitly traded on 
their self-bonding status in order to trim reclamation obligations.102 Here is 
how Macey and Salovaara describe these transactions: 
The first part of [Alpha Natural Resources’] strategy was simple. As 
part of the bankruptcy proceedings, Alpha cut deals with Wyoming 
and West Virginia regulators which allowed the company to continue 
mining, even though it no longer met the self-bonding requirements 
and could not post alternative bonds. For instance, Alpha granted 
 
98. See Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency 
and the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 897 n.82 (2019) (describing the bankruptcy 
filing of Alpha Natural Resources in 2015). 
99. GAO 2018 REPORT, supra note 82, at 21–22; see also Macey & Salovaara, supra note 98, at 
897–98. 
100. Macey & Salovaara, supra note 98.  
101. Nair, supra note 84. 
102. See, e.g., Dylan Brown, Alpha, W.Va. Finalize Mine Cleanup Deal, E&E NEWS PM (Jul. 13, 
2016), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060040237/search?keyword=Dylan+Brown [https:/ 
/perma.cc/D7ZS-4J24]. In at least one instance (the Wyoming deal with Alpha), the federal Office of 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement (OSMRE) has explicitly declared a state-negotiated deal 
to run afoul of bonding requirements in federal law. Dylan Brown, Feds Slap Wyo. over Alpha’s 
Liabilities, GREENWIRE (July 13, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060040226/search 
?keyword=Dylan+Brown [https://perma.cc/7NH5-QHQC]. 











Wyoming a $61 million superpriority claim to cover the company’s 
$411 million of reclamation bonding obligations in that State. 
Similarly, Alpha granted West Virginia a $24 million superpriority 
claim and a $15 million letter of credit to cover the company’s $244 
million of reclamation obligations in that State. Although Alpha 
owed a total of $655 million in reclamation liabilities, state regulators 
agreed to accept a superpriority claim on only $85 million in the event 
that the company stopped operating. This arrangement seemingly 
gave Alpha a legal right to abandon over $500 million in cleanup 
costs that the company would have had to pay had it been forced to 
liquidate.103  
Bankruptcy declarations impede the dollar-for-dollar replacement of 
self-bonds envisioned by SMCRA regulations. But bankruptcy does more 
damage than that. The recent spate of coal bankruptcies demonstrates 
vividly how the Chapter 11 reorganization process104 enables coal producers 
to restructure selectively, placing high-performing assets into one successor 
corporation and assets saddled with reclamation liabilities into another. 
Macey and Salovaara’s work is instructive here again, as their account 
explains in detail how Chapter 11 was used by Peabody, Arch, and other 
major coal firms to create successor entities that were destined for 
bankruptcy, while other successors—those no longer responsible for 
defunct mines—were set up for success.105 
Viewed against the long history of abandoned coal mines, the current 
state of affairs is striking. There is a wealth of evidence that, even under the 
strictures of modern law, coal producers are quite successfully shirking 
responsibility for mine reclamation. Reclamation rules are under-inclusive 
in that they generally do not require the complete abatement of 
environmental harms; financial assurance requirements are insufficient in 
that they under-estimate the cost of reclamation and often allow self-
bonding; and the bankruptcy process allows firms to shed reclamation 
liabilities by reorganizing. That these problems persist, some forty years 
after the passage of SMCRA, testifies to the enduring difficulty of managing 
the temporal spillovers that inhere in negative-value property. 
 
103. Macey & Salovaara, supra note 98, at 919 (footnotes omitted). 
104. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1195. 
105. Macey & Salovaara, supra note 98. Patriot Coal, for example, was in such a precarious 
financial situation as it emerged from bankruptcy that it was “created to fail” in the view of the United 
Mine Workers of America. Id. at 913 (quoting Ken Ward Jr., Patriot Bankruptcy Heating Up, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Aug. 25, 2012), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/special_reports/ 
patriot-bankruptcy-case-heating-up/article_0ca4d57b-09cd-5153-8d9b-5a0126a011d4.html [https://per 
ma.cc/6DMK-GH3M]). Even the CEO acknowledged that the firm at its inception had “too many 












2. Oil and Gas Wells 
Oil and gas production is widespread in the United States in part because, 
unlike most other countries, American property law generally allows 
landowners to develop mineral resources lying beneath the surface of their 
land. 106  Thanks to the rule of capture, the law also shields producing 
landowners from liability when they drain oil and gas from neighboring 
parcels.107 The neighbor’s only remedy is to drill a well on his or her tract 
and withdraw more oil from the same common pool.108 This resource race 
dynamic, atop a continent saturated with fossil fuels, led to drilling boom 
after drilling boom during the twentieth century.  
Photos from oil-rich Texas and California taken in the early 1900s show 
hundreds of rigs crammed just feet apart where “gushers” had been found, 
as fortunate landowners capitalized by selling land bit by bit to greedy 
speculators. 109  This cheek-by-jowl pattern of intensive drilling had the 
unfortunate consequence of dissipating the natural pressure or “drive” that 
propels oil and gas to the surface.110 Oil country was soon littered with 
countless defunct wells. Still today, instead of a small number of efficient 
and high-producing wells as is typical in other oil regions, the United States 
has an enormous proportion of low-producing wells. 111  Here the mean 
production quantity is on the order of 11 barrels per well per day; in Saudi 
Arabia, it is far closer to 6,000 barrels.112 Some three million wellbores have 
 
106. Joel B. Eisen, Emily Hammond, Jim Rossi, David B. Spence, Jacqueline L. Weaver & 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Energy, Economics and the Environment 149 (4th ed., 2015) (noting that “[i]n 
virtually all other countries of the world [besides the United States], the state owns the mineral 
resources”). 
107. See TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE 
WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 7 (2010). See generally id. (a comparative analysis of capture principles from 
several jurisdictions). 
108. “If, then, the landowner drills on his own land at such a spot as best subserves his 
purposes, what is the standing of the adjoining landowner whose oil or gas may be 
drained by this well? He certainly ought not to be allowed to stop his neighbor from 
developing his own farm. . . . What then can the neighbor do? Nothing: only go and do 
likewise. He must protect his own oil and gas. He knows it is wild and will run away if 
it finds an opening and it is his business to keep it at home.”  
Barnard v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907). 
109. See, e.g., Spindletop History, LAMAR UNIV. https://www.lamar.edu/spindletop-gladys-city/s 
pindletop-history.html [https://perma.cc/YF42-H6R2]. 
110. In many instances, an oil field’s natural drive was depleted after just a tiny fraction of the 
field’s oil had been produced—perhaps just 3–5%. EISEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 165–66 (noting that 
less than 5% of the Spindletop field’s oil was produced under its natural drive). To produce the remaining 
oil and gas, landowners had to install pumps or repressurize the oil field artificially. 
111. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS WELLS 
BY PRODUCTION RATE 5 (2018) (“In 2017, 81% of the nearly 1 million [active] U.S. wells produced 15 
or fewer BOE [barrels of oil equivalent]/day . . . .”). 
112. 2 ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel, eds. 1999) App. 
10 51-52, cited in EISEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 174–75. 











been drilled across the United States, and the majority of these wells are 
now dry holes, no longer in active production.113  
What happens to these wells? A distressing number are simply 
abandoned. As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, “[d]rilling booms 
historically leave legions of idle wells that become state or federal 
wards.”114 Wyoming, for example, is currently sitting on perhaps 4,000 idle 
and abandoned wells,115 and the problem is likely larger in Colorado, Texas, 
and other oil and gas states.116 The COVID-19 pandemic, and its dramatic 
effect on global oil markets, will almost certainly lead to an increase in 
abandoned wells.117  
The incentive to abandon idle wells is substantial. They yield no income 
and may require significant expenditure related to well closure or well site 
cleanup.118 Unattended well sites are associated with methane emissions 
and water pollution.119Although the release of liquids and gases slows over 
 
113. See Mary Kang et al., Identification and Characterization of High Methane-Emitting 
Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 13636, 13636 (2016). Some estimates 
posit as many as twelve million wells. See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Deteriorating Oil and Gas Wells 
Threaten Drinking Water, Homes Across the Country, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (updated Dec. 2, 
2017), https://www.adn.com/energy/article/deteriorating-oil-and-gas-wells-threaten-drinking-water-ho 
mes-across-country/2011/04/07/ [https://perma.cc /3T3D-WGE6]. 
114. Dan Frosch & Russell Gold, How ‘Orphan’ Wells Leave States Holding the Cleanup Bag, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2015. 
115. See Stephanie Joyce, Oil Crash Raises New Fears About Abandoned Wells, INSIDE ENERGY 
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://insideenergy.org/2015/09/25/oil-crash-raises-new-fears-about-abandoned-wells/ 
[https://perma.cc/NZ48-2AGL]; see also Irina Zhorov, Coalbed Methane Bust Leaves Thousands of 
Orphaned Gas Wells in Wyoming, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2014 (noting that “Wyoming has about 
1,200 abandoned wells”). 
116. See Bruce Finley & Joe Murphy, Colorado Land Impact of Oil and Gas Boom: Scars Spread 
and Stay, DENVER POST, Mar. 1, 2015; Dave Fehling, Texas Lawmakers Worry How State Will Keep up 
with Abandoned Oil Wells, HOUSTON PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 7, 2016, 5:16 PM), https://www.houstonpu 
blicmedia.org/articles/news/2016/03/07/140534/texas-lawmakers-worry-how-state-will-keep-up-with-
abandoned-oil-wells/ [https://perma.cc/C6EX-GHJ8].  
117. Richards, supra note 6; Nichola Groom, Special Report: Millions of Abandoned Oil Wells 
Are Leaking Methane, a Climate Menace, REUTERS (June 16, 2020, 6:14 AM) https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-drilling-abandoned-specialreport/special-report-millions-of-abandoned-oil-wells-are-lea 
king-methane-a-climate-menace-idUSKBN23N1NL [https://perma.cc/HF97-DGFA] (noting that 
“drilling companies are likely to abandon many more wells due to bankruptcies, as oil prices struggle to 
recover from historic lows after the coronavirus pandemic crushed global fuel demand, according to 
bankruptcy lawyers, industry analysts and state regulators”). 
118. Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 765–
75, 788–92, 799–01 (2013) (describing in detail various well site risks).  
119. See Mya Frazier, Gas Companies Are Abandoning Their Wells, Leaving Them to Spew 
Methane Forever, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2020, 3:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/ 
2020-09-17/abandoned-gas-wells-are-left-to-spew-methane-for-eternity [https://perma.cc/E2MK-WCR 
K]. See also, e.g., K.S.A. § 55-179(d) (declaring that “any well which has been abandoned, in fact, and 
has not been plugged . . . shall be and is hereby deemed likely to cause pollution of any usable water 












the life of a well, it never ceases completely.120 Releases from idle wells can 
cause significant harms and, to make matters worse, such releases may go 
undetected for many years precisely because the well is unmonitored or has 
been abandoned.121 For this reason, oil and gas states require drillers to plug 
old wells as they are taken out of production.122 In the early years of the oil 
and gas industry, depleted or “dry” wells were simply left uncovered or 
capped with wood or brush. 123  Hundreds of thousands, perhaps even 
millions, of abandoned wells remain in such a condition.124 A wood or brush 
cap, of course, cannot reliably prevent gaseous or liquid releases. More 
recent drilling regulations require that cement be used to seal the top of the 
wellbore and to create plugs at various intervals along the wellbore.125  
Effective plugging is not inexpensive: the cost of carrying out a plugging 
and abandonment operation depends primarily on the length of the wellbore, 
and as drilling operations have extended deeper into the earth, costs have 
 
120. Even the McClintock Well #1, located at the Drake Well Museum in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania, where the American oil industry was launched, continues to produce a small amount of 
oil to this day. See McClintock Well #1, DRAKE WELL MUSEUM AND PAK, https://www.drakewell.org/w 
hat-to-see-and-do/mcclintock-well-1 [https://perma.cc/2GXL-3MEN].  
121. See generally Jaqueline Ho, Alan Krupnick, Katrina McLaughlin, Clayton Munnings & Jhih-
Shyang Shih, Plugging the Gaps in Inactive Well Policy (2016), https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-
Rpt-PluggingInactiveWells.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C4Q-ZWCH]; Kate Galbraith, Abandoned Oil Wells 
Raise Fears of Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2013; Nicholas Kusnetz, ProPublica, Deteriorating Oil 
and Gas Wells Threaten Drinking Water Across the Country, SCI. AM., Apr. 4, 2011. 
122. See, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-11-3; TEX. ADMIN. CODE, title 16, pt. 1, ch. 3, § 
3.14.  
123. An early Pennsylvania law, for example, required well operators to “plug their oil wells, at 
proper depth, with wood and sediment, in a manner sufficient to exclude all fresh water from oil-bearing 
rock, and to prevent the flow of oil and gas into fresh water.” WILLIAM WHEELER THORNTON, 2 THE 
LAW RELATING TO OIL AND GAS 1461 (3d ed. 1918) (listing a 1913 Pennsylvania statute on plugging 
of oil and gas wells); see also Technology Subgroup of the Operations & Environment Task Group, 
Plugging and Abandonment of Oil and Gas Wells (NPC N. Am. Res. Dev. Study, Working Paper No. 
2-25, 2011) [hereinafter National Petroleum Council], https://www.npc.org/Prudent_Development-Topi 
c_Papers/2-25_Well_Plugging_and_Abandonment_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX5X-KAAZ]. For an 
eye-opening account of the damage that can result from uncapped wells, see Jim Malewitz, In West 
Texas, Abandoned Well Sinks Land, Sucks Tax Dollars, TEXAS TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2017, 12:00 AM), https:// 
www.texastribune.org/2017/01/22/west-texas-abandoned-well-sinks-land-sucks-tax-dol/ [https://perma 
.cc/287N-VB3Q]. 
124. It is difficult to estimate the number of abandoned wells with precision. In New York, for 
example, experts suggest that as many as half of the state’s abandoned wells are “forgotten,” their 
locations unknown. Ronald E. Bishop, Historical Analysis of Oil and Gas Well Plugging in New York: 
Is the Regulatory System Working?, 23 NEW SOLS. 103, 104–105 (2013). 
125. Technology Subgroup of the Operations & Environment Task Group, supra note 123, at 7; 
HO ET AL., supra note 121, at 35–39 (describing heterogeneity of well plugging requirements). 











soared. 126  Whereas older wells could be plugged for perhaps several 
thousand dollars, plugging a deep modern well can easily cost $100,000.127 
As with surface coal mines, the imposition of costly end-of-life 
requirements for oil and gas wells threatened to push the value of many 
wells into the red. Wells that previously might have been regarded as low-
value or zero-value came to represent a clear liability to their owners. And 
as with surface coal mines, the emergence of this liability led to patterns and 
practices within the oil and gas industry that cut against the fulfillment of 
well-closure requirements. 
The most important pattern by far is a tendency towards delay. Faced 
with the prospect of expensive plugging and abandonment procedures, oil 
and gas firms tend to delay well closure as long as possible. Even without 
plugging costs, producers have no incentive to hasten well closure and every 
incentive to wait: underperforming wells that are uneconomical under 
certain price conditions may, if oil prices rise, become profitable in the 
future. For this reason, it has long been industry practice, in many instances, 
 
126. “Plugging and abandonment” (or simply “P&A”) is industry jargon for this category of 
expenditure; the term “abandonment,” in this context, refers to the business decision to terminate well 
production, rather than a legal process of abandoning ownership. 
127. See Stephanie Joyce & Jordan Wirfs-Brock, The Rising Cost of Cleaning Up After Oil and 
Gas, INSIDE ENERGY (Oct. 1, 2015), http://insideenergy.org/2015/10/01/the-rising-cost-of-cleaning-up-
after-oil-and-gas/ [https://perma.cc/WB64-8X8Z] (noting the relationship between well depth and 
plugging cost). The most expensive well plugging operation mentioned in this article cost a whopping 
$527,829. Well plugging and abandonment cost estimates vary greatly based on well characteristics and 
reclamation practices and requirements. Some reports assume a per-well cost as low as $15,000; other 
estimates stretch into the millions of dollars. Compare OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, REP. NO. 2016-EAU-061, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT’S IDLE WELL PROGRAM 4 (2018) 
(assuming a cost of $15,000 per well in one field office), with Lucija Muehlenbachs, 80,000 Inactive Oil 
Wells: A Blessing or a Curse?, UNIV. CALGARY SCH. PUB. POL’Y BRIEFING PAPER, Feb. 2017, at 2 
(citing estimates ranging from $50,000 to several million dollars per well). 
Plugging and abandonment costs have been rising, even for shallow wells, for several reasons. First, 
industry and regulatory standards have been tightened in response to emerging information about, in 
particular, methane leakage from oil and gas wells, which contributes to climate change. Second, 
unconventional production near existing oil fields often involves unintentional stimulation or 
repressurization of those fields, which can cause previously idled or abandoned wells to leak. See Shane 
Hoover, Special Report: Uncovering Abandoned Oil and Natural Gas Wells, CANTONREP.COM (July 
16, 2015, 9:58 AM) https://www.cantonrep.com/article/20150716/SPECIAL-REPORTS/150719981 [ht 
tps://perma.cc/P9Q6-2YTF] (“When abandoned wells are near the rock layer being fractured, the 
increased underground pressure can cause the old wells to leak oil and gas, similar to the way squeezing 
a juice box squirts liquid from the straw.”); see also Richard J. Davies et al., Oil and Gas Wells and 
Their Integrity: Implications for Shale and Unconventional Resource Exploitation, 56 MARINE & 
PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 239 (2014); Mary Kang et al., Direct Measurements of Methane Emissions from 
Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells in Pennsylvania, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18173 (2014); Amy 
Townsend-Small, Thomas W. Ferrara, David R. Lyon, Anastasia E. Fries & Brian K. Lamb, Emissions 
of Coalbed and Natural Gas Methane from Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells in the United States, 43 
GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS 2283 (2016); Jennifer Oldham, In the Birthplace of U.S. Oil, Methane 














to maintain a portfolio of marginal, idle wells.128 Even when such wells no 
longer fit into a producer’s strategy—perhaps because they are unlikely to 
become profitable—the typical move is to sell them to another firm with a 
different risk profile, rather than to undertake expensive plugging and 
abandonment procedures. In the words of one oil and gas executive:  
I think you will find that it is rare for the larger companies to plug 
and abandon their older wells. Rather, at some point, a smaller 
company with lower overheads and less expensive operating costs 
will offer to buy the old wells at a price that gives the original 
company a better return than continued operations. The original 
company uses the cash to finance new investments. The buying 
company operates with lower costs because they spend less on 
maintenance and safety items and they have fewer well- qualified 
people to pay. The chain may end there or continue through smaller 
and ever lower cost operators who do no preventive maintenance at 
all, do the bare minimum of repairs to keep the well going and 
eventually walk away, maybe after plugging the hole as cheaply as 
possible and maybe not plugging at all.  
In conventional fields these selling/buying cycles might start 
when the field is 20-30 years old and run for another 20–30 years. By 
the time these wells are abandoned, the casings have been subjected 
to corrosive fluids for many years. When it costs too much to repair 
versus what might be produced, the well is abandoned. Whether it is 
plugged before it is abandoned depends on the final operator. In tight 
shale this could all take place over a much shorter time period and 
the abandoned wells could increase quickly.129  
This dynamic is exacerbated, of course, by the rising cost of plugging 
and abandonment, which increases the incentive to delay. The result is that 
unproductive, unplugged wells are legion in oil and gas territory and that 
producers hew tightly to the fiction that such wells should not be closed 
because they may one day become productive again. Perhaps they will—
but it is likely that most will simply remain idle until their owners go belly-
up, at which point the plugging and abandonment costs may well wind up 
at the feet of taxpayers.130  
 
128. See, e.g., Muehlenbachs, supra note 127, at 5–6 (describing operators’ incentive to delay 
plugging and abandonment in order to maintain the possibility of future production). 
129. Bishop, supra note 124, at 107 (quoting from personal communication received by the author 
in January 2012 from Louis W. Allstadt, retired Executive Vice President of Mobil Oil Corporation). 
130. See Muehlenbachs, supra note 127, at 2 (noting that a “significant increase in the number of 
reactivated oil and gas wells” is unlikely absent implausible conditions, implying that wells are “left 
suspended not because of the option to reactivate, but rather to avoid costly environmental obligations . 
. . . introducing a high risk of potential future liability for both the industry and taxpayers”). 











To counteract this pattern, oil and gas states (as well as the U.S. federal 
government, in certain instances) have enacted financial assurance 
requirements, just as they did for coal mines.131 But also as with coal mines, 
financial assurance requirements are plagued with difficulties. Simply 
keeping track of existing wells and their status is an enormous challenge; 
much more could be said about this, but suffice it to say that well data is 
often imprecise at best.132 And when, exactly, should a government agency 
insist upon closure?133 Tracking well productivity is difficult, as is assessing 
the profitability of marginally-performing wells. Temporarily idled wells 
may one day be placed back into production, so even when a firm has gone 
bankrupt, it may not be clear that its portfolio of wells should be forever 
sealed.134 Perhaps the wells will be purchased and further developed by a 
successor entity.  
Moreover, bonding requirements take a one-size-fits-all approach in that 
they typically establish a uniform bond amount, applicable to all wells, 
despite the fact that the cost of well closure is highly variable.135 The per-
well amount is often far too low to cover the actual cost of proper closure.136 
Most jurisdictions also allow a blanket cap on bonding: once an operator 
has bonded a certain number of wells, no further bonding is required.137 As 
 
131. See, e.g., Lucas W. Davis, Bonding Requirements for U.S. Natural Gas Producers, 9 Rev. 
ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 128 (2015); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-245, OIL AND GAS 
BONDS: BONDING REQUIREMENTS AND BLM EXPENDITURES TO RECLAIM ORPHANED WELLS (2010). 
132. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Off. of Inspector Gen., supra note 127 (noting deficiencies 
in BLM’s tracking program); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, OIL AND GAS WELLS: 
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with self-bonding, this limitation is apparently intended to account for the 
financial integrity of larger producers. Instead, it yields inadequate bonding 
coverage.138 And in any event, financial assurance requirements provide no 
remedy when previously completed plugging operations prove inadequate. 
Bonds are released upon the completion of a plugging and abandonment 
procedure, but not infrequently, previously plugged wells present new 
risks.139 This may be because plugging was carried out improperly, 140 or 
because prior abandonment procedures did not anticipate new risks.  
All these problems could easily be fixed by tightening bond 
requirements. But because bonds tie up operating capital, oil and gas firms 
resist increased bonding, and they have a record of political success.141 
Many jurisdictions’ bonding rules have not been updated in decades and 
reflect outmoded well plugging techniques. 142  To compensate for the 
inadequacy of financial assurance rules, many oil and gas states also 
maintain abandoned well funds, usually bankrolled by taxes on oil and gas 
production, in order to pay for the closure of abandoned wells.143 These 
programs vary in their size and efficacy, but most analysts expect that fund 
resources are insufficient for the population of wells requiring closure.144  
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To summarize, then, the oil and gas industry presents a negative-value 
property dilemma that mirrors the case of surface coal mining in many 
respects. Bond coverage is required but leaves substantial gaps. Both per-
well and blanket bonding amounts are inadequate to guarantee proper well 
closure. States have supplemented bond programs with abandoned well 
funds, but these funds are unlikely to cover even existing liabilities. An 
untold number of wells limp along, unlikely ever again to produce in paying 
quantities, yet not targeted for plugging and closure, leaving the public with 
a liability of unknown magnitude.145 
3. Hardrock and Other Mines 
Most high school students learn about the California Gold Rush, but far 
fewer learn how thoroughly the American West was (and continues to be) 
scoured for valuable minerals.146 Lead, copper, silver, uranium—these and 
many other minerals have been extracted in massive quantities throughout 
the region.147  When the West was sparsely populated, mining activities 
tended to be of the cut-and-run variety. Minerals were extracted from 
relatively desolate landscapes, and mining sites were simply abandoned 
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when their purpose had been served.148 The result is that Western lands are 
pockmarked with the scars of long-forgotten mining operations. Already by 
1977, the EPA estimated that two million acres in America were “orphaned” 
mine lands.149  
Orphaned mines vary enormously in size, ranging from vast open pits 
(like the Berkeley Pit) to barely visible openings leading to underground 
mine shafts. Orphaned mines vary also in the risks they represent. 
Abandoned mines create acid mine drainage, taint both surface and 
subsurface water supplies, threaten wildlife, endanger users of the outdoors, 
and at the most extreme can lead to extraordinary contamination of large 
areas or waterways.150 Some of the nation’s most expensive industrial waste 
cleanup sites are former mining sites. 151  Mines associated with certain 
minerals carry special hazards: uranium mines, for example, have a 
particularly lethal legacy.152  
This section began with a brief description of the Berkeley Pit in Butte, 
Montana. The costs of ongoing management at that defunct copper mine are 
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largely borne by successors of the Anaconda mining company, which 
operated the Pit for many years.153 But there are countless other negative-
value mines nearby whose reclamation costs will be carried entirely by the 
public, as Jared Diamond describes: 
In Montana there are about 20,000 abandoned mines, some of them 
recent but many of them a century or more old, that will be leaking 
acid and . . . toxic metals essentially forever. The vast majority of 
those mines have no surviving owners to bear financial 
responsibility, or else the known owners aren’t rich enough to reclaim 
the mine and treat its acid drainage in perpetuity.154 
Except in those instances in which a successor corporation can be identified 
for purposes of liability, the costs of cleanup and reclamation for abandoned 
mines are borne by taxpayers.155  
The mining industry claims that the problem of mine abandonment is “a 
finite and historical problem and not one that will grow in the future,” 
because under current regulations, “today’s mines are designed, built and 
operated for closure.”156  It is true that mining regulation today requires 
reclamation backed by financial assurances in many instances.157 But this 
regulatory scheme is subject to similar pathologies as those described above 
in connection with coal mines and oil and gas wells. In some cases, the 
substance of the reclamation requirements falls short of preventing the 
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emergence of negative-value property. As to pit mines, for example, 
reclamation rules generally do not require that such mines are backfilled and 
restored to their prior condition.158 In part, this is because residual ore that 
is presently not economically recoverable may one day become so, and 
backfilling would foreclose future recovery.159 But mostly it is because truly 
massive pits would be financially impractical to backfill.160 Instead, defunct 
pit mines become lakes when dewatering pumps are shut off. As the 
Berkeley Pit demonstrates, these lakes can become toxic.  
Quite apart from the substance of reclamation requirements, the financial 
assurances required of mining entities are in many cases insufficient to 
cover the costs of reclamation. Nearly every study that has explored the 
matter has reached this conclusion. The GAO, for example, has issued 
several reports concluding that the federal Bureau of Land Management’s 
financial assurances requirements are inadequate. 161  State requirements, 
too, are deficient, and in some instances, state officials are none too eager 
to establish the extent of the shortfall.162 In West Virginia, for example, 
environmental organizations attempted in vain for years to learn how much 
state money was being spent on sites at which bonds had been forfeited, 
information they sought in order to demand that mining firms pay cleanup 
costs themselves.163  
In short, hardrock mines present the potential for negative value 
property, and existing financial assurance rules may well be insufficient to 
internalize the costs of post-closure cleanup.  
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Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2010). 











B. Obsolete and Derelict Structures 
Another important subcategory of negative-value property is property on 
which is located a derelict structure, for which the cost of disassembly or 
cleanup exceeds any residual land value. Many derelict structures can be 
rededicated to alternate uses with relative ease, but others require expensive 
handling. In these instances, land may be zero-value if the law simply allows 
it to be left in its current state. But where dismantling or remediation is 
required by law, such property becomes negative in value unless the land 
can be sold for an amount greater than the cost of cleanup.  
1. Nuclear Power Plants 
At the time of this writing, there are ninety-eight commercial nuclear 
reactors in operation in the United States, located at fifty-nine sites.164 
Nuclear power plants are extraordinarily complex structures that require 
expensive decontamination processes upon closure in order to prevent the 
release of radioactive material.165 The law requires plant operators to set 
aside funds for decommissioning, but projections indicate these funds may 
be insufficient.166  In all likelihood, sizeable public expenditures will be 
required to remediate defunct plant sites. 
The financial assurance scheme for nuclear power plants is relatively 
straightforward. Generally, plant operators are required by Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations to direct a portion of plant 
revenues into a decommissioning fund.167 The amount is established by a 
federal formula and is based on NRC estimates about the costs of proper 
decommissioning.168 The formula and NRC estimates have been heavily 
criticized. First, there is mounting evidence that the NRC underestimates 
the costs of plant closure. The Callan Institute reports annually on the 
adequacy of nuclear trust funds; in its most recent report, the Institute 
concluded that these funds at the time covered only 71% of the expected 
costs of decommissioning. 169  A recent audit conducted by the NRC’s 
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Inspector General revealed that the Commission’s funding formula is based 
on studies conducted in the 1970s.170 The GAO had raised similar issues a 
half decade earlier, finding that calculations of decommissioning 
expenditures included as little as 57% of the costs estimated by plant 
operators themselves.171  
Second, a funding model dependent on setting aside a share of revenues 
takes for granted the extended commercial viability of the plants 
themselves.172 But nuclear power plants have struggled recently due to stiff 
competition from wind, solar, and natural gas generators.173 Although some 
states are working hard to bail out their nuclear plants, a number of plants 
have closed ahead of schedule and more are slated for early retirement.174 
Early closure, in turn, could imperil the adequacy of the trust funds required 
for closure.175 
Finally, it is worth noting that the entire nuclear decommissioning 
process is shrouded in uncertainty. Only a few U.S. plants have yet been 
decommissioned; much about the process remains unknown. 176  But the 
greatest source of uncertainty has to do with the treatment of spent nuclear 
fuel. Despite decades of effort, federal officials have failed to resolve an 
intractable dispute about where to site a national nuclear waste repository.177 
For as long as this national problem endures—and there is no end even 
remotely in sight—nuclear power plants themselves will continue to serve 
as the interim resting place for the spent fuel rods previously used to power 
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those plants.178 The costs associated with extended spent fuel management 
are typically not included in the NRC’s decommissioning cost estimates.179 
Instead, these costs are initially born by plant operators, who then seek 
federal reimbursement due to the government’s breach of its obligations to 
dispose of waste.180 This too is a form of temporal externality, a cost shifted 
from plant owners to the general public. 
If there is a ray of hope, it is this: as firms develop expertise with 
decommissioning processes, a new model is emerging. In order to limit their 
downside risk, some operators of shuttered plants have transferred their 
plant licenses—along with the accumulated decommissioning funds—to 
separate entities with experience in plant decommissioning. 181  The 
existence of such a market suggests that, in some cases, firms believe that 
they can complete closure for less money than the fund contains, retaining 
any surplus as profit. If they are correct, this is all to the good; if they are 
incorrect, however, the public may be left worse off, because 
decommissioning firms may have fewer outside assets which could be 
tapped into should the need arise. 
2. Other Power Plants 
Nuclear power plants present a unique set of worries due to the risk of 
radioactive release. But other electricity generating facilities also raise now-
familiar concerns about negative-value property. Power plants face 
unavoidable dismantling and decommissioning expenditures. Coal-fired 
power plants, for example, generate “coal ash” as a byproduct of 
combustion. Coal ash contains dangerous heavy metals and other toxins.182 
Plant operators that impound coal ash on site are required to address these 
 
178. See, e.g., Fred Pearce, Opinion, Awash in Radioactive Waste, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), h 
ttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/opinion/nuclear-power-radioactive-waste.html [https://perma.cc/ 
AX6X-SC5E]. 
179. The costs of spent fuel management are not included in NRC decommissioning cost estimates 
because spent fuel removal is not required to terminate a plant’s operating license. See 10 C.F.R. § 
50.75(c) (2020); U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 170, at 7. 
180. Huber, supra note 177, at 1204–11. 
181. See, e.g., NUCLEAR ENERGY INSIDER, DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE 
U.S.: LICENSE TRANSFER: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2016); LATHAM & WATKINS CLIENT 
ALERT WHITE PAPER NO. 2236, NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING AND LEGAL RISK (NOV. 14, 2017); 
WILMERHALE, NUCLEAR POWER IN THE AGE OF DECOMMISSIONING (MAR. 14, 2019). 
182. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-85R, COAL COMBUSTION 
RESIDUE: STATUS OF EPA’S EFFORTS TO REGULATE DISPOSAL (2010). See also ENV’T INTEGRITY 













impoundments upon plant retirement. 183  Even after decommissioning, 
former coal sites may carry significant liabilities. Owners and operators are 
currently required to monitor groundwater quality for thirty years following 
plant closure.184 These monitoring programs impose substantial costs, and 
if contamination is found, groundwater remediation efforts could impose 
yet further expenses on site owners. Because these requirements are 
relatively new, reliable cost estimates do not yet exist.185 
How will such costs be borne? Regulated utilities generally build 
decommissioning costs into their rate base so that costs are recovered from 
electricity consumers.186 But where generating facilities are not subject to 
cost-of-service regulation and instead sell electricity into competitive 
wholesale markets, coverage for decommissioning expenditures rests on a 
shakier footing. Generators like these are usually beyond the reach of state 
utilities commissions.187 Publicly traded energy firms are required to list 
“asset retirement obligations” as a liability in their regular securities filings, 
but such obligations could easily be understated, 188 and in any event, private 
firms have no similar obligation and are not legally required to accumulate 
decommissioning funds during the years of a plant’s operation. And 
bankruptcy offers a potential escape: firms undergoing Chapter 11 
reorganizations can sometimes negotiate for release from or limitation of 
environmental liabilities.189 
 
183. See generally Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of Coal 
Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,302 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 257, 261); Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion 
Residuals from Electric Utilities; Amendments to the National Minimum Criteria (Phase One, Part One), 
83 Fed. Reg. 36,435 (July 30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 257). For news accounts of dangerous 
incidents involving coal ash releases, see Shaila Dewan, At Plant in Coal Ash Spill, Toxic Deposits by 
the Ton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/30/us/30sludge.html [https://p 
erma.cc/6MHL-WRBQ]; Kendra Pierre-Louis, Nadja Popovich & Hiroko Tabuchi, Florence’s 
Floodwaters Breach Coal Ash Pond and Imperil Other Toxic Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/13/climate/hurricane-florence-environmental-hazards.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/K3SW-2QSH]. 
184. See RAIMI, supra note 14, at 24 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 257). 
185. Id.; see also ENV’T INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 182.  
186. RAIMI, supra note 14, at 38. Raimi notes, however, that in some cases, large unanticipated 
costs arise, which are borne disproportionately by current ratepayers, causing yet another form of 
temporal spillover. 
187. See generally LINCOLN L. DAVIES & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 57–66 (2015). 
188. See RAIMI, supra note 14, at 39–40. 
189. See, e.g., Jeffrey Tomich, Feds Blast FirstEnergy for ‘Abuse of the Bankruptcy System,’ E&E 
NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019) https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060140823/search?keyword 
=Feds+Blast+FirstEnergy+for+Abuse+of+the+Bankruptcy+System [https://perma.cc/U9SC-W5TJ] 
(describing federal and state interventions in a Chapter 11 proceeding in order to prevent inadequate 
coverage of coal and nuclear power plant decommissioning costs). 











Coal-fired power plants are numerous and will represent an important 
category of negative-value property for years to come.190 But there are other 
electricity generating facilities whose liabilities are less widely known. 
Hydroelectric dams, for example, appear so permanent that one can be 
forgiven for forgetting that they, too, have a finite lifespan and are prone to 
failure.191 The Federal Power Act, the most significant federal law bearing 
upon hydroelectric facilities, says almost nothing about the allocation of 
expenses upon a dam’s retirement.192 It was newsworthy, then, when the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1995 claimed the 
authority to order the decommissioning and removal of obsolete dams at the 
expense of dam owners.193 But FERC has not made extensive use of this 
authority against uncooperative licensees, nor has it tested the policy in 
court. 194  Instead, dam removal costs are typically allocated during a 
settlement process, as operators avoid direct challenges to FERC 
authority.195 Unless and until that authority is firmly established, dams too 
represent a category of potential negative-value property, and the costs of 
dam removal loom as a temporal externality, a cost shifted from the dam-
building generation to the dam-removing generation. 
Not all power generating facilities, then, are accompanied by prepaid 
funds that sit ready for disbursement upon the facility’s retirement. A good 
many such facilities are or will become negative-value property, and the 
 
190. Some 433 plants have gone offline since 2005, and of those still operating, nearly 300 are at 
least fifty years old. RAIMI, supra note 14, at 19. 
191. See, e.g., Kristine Phillips, The Stunning Destruction at Oroville Dam and the Work Ahead, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02 
/14/its-like-the-rock-was-melting-the-stunning-destruction-at-oroville-dam-and-the-work-ahead/ [https 
://perma.cc/S9W7-NHMV] (describing the near failure of the massive Oroville Dam in northern 
California); NIC LANE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 33108, AGING INFRASTRUCTURE: DAM SAFETY (2006). 
192. See Beth C. Bryant, FERC’s Dam Decommissioning Authority Under the Federal Power Act, 
74 WASH. L. REV. 95, 106 n.106 (1999) (noting that “[d]uring the water power legislation debates, dam 
removal was rarely mentioned, and even then summarily dismissed without further discussion”). 
193. Project Decommissioning at Relicensing; Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 339 (Jan. 4, 1995) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.24 (2020)). See generally Bryant, supra note 192 (arguing in support of FERC 
authority); Michael A. Swiger, Ann P Southwick & Stephanie L. Mairs, Paying for the Change: Can 
the FERC Force Dam Decommissioning at Relicensing?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 163 (1996) (arguing the 
opposite); Katherine Costenbader, Comment, Damning Dams: Bearing the Cost of Restoring America’s 
Rivers, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635 (1998) (analyzing, inter alia, the nature of the operator’s property 
interest in a dam license); Carlos M. Marquez, II, Federal Power Act Limitations on FERC Dam 
Decommissioning Authority: Shielding Preexisting Licensees and Revisiting Trust Funds to Protect the 
Public Interest, 27 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 157, 170 (2016) (referring to the 
decision as “The FERC Bombshell”).  
194. In several proceedings following its announcement, FERC asserted its decommissioning 
authority, but subsequent removals have proceeded by way of settlement negotiations. See Marquez, II, 
supra note 193, at 171–75. 
195. See id. at 172; U.S. SOC’Y ON DAMS, GUIDELINES FOR DAM DECOMMISSIONING PROJECTS 
19–20 (2015). See generally Philip M. Bender, Restoring the Elwha, White Salmon, and Rogue Rivers: 













costs of their decommissioning, if undertaken, will fall upon the general 
public. 
3. Gas Stations and Underground Storage Tanks 
The sorts of sites just discussed—nuclear power plants, coal-fired power 
plants, hydroelectric dams, and the like—tend to involve massive, 
conspicuous installations. These facilities cannot easily be hidden, nor could 
their owners readily abandon these properties and escape notice. By 
contrast, there are other forms of negative-value property (or potential 
negative-value property) that are much less conspicuous but more 
numerous, and thus quite important as a matter of public policy. Service 
stations, and the underground storage tanks often used to hold their gasoline 
and diesel products, furnish just such an example. 
Gas stations trade in products that contain dangerous contaminants.196 
Unfortunately, the tanks used to store gasoline products have a long history 
of leakage, resulting in site contamination and sometimes groundwater 
infiltration as well.197  During the 1980s, Congress passed legislation to 
address the growing number of leaking underground storage tanks. 198 
Pursuant to this legislation, the EPA established strict standards for new 
tank installations and required existing tanks to be upgraded, removed, or 
replaced by 1998.199 In addition, Congress created a fund to help states pay 
for cleanup where a responsible party could not complete the task.200 The 
cost of site cleanup is high relative to the scale of the businesses involved, 
and many tank owners lack the financial wherewithal to clean up their sites 
adequately. 201  The resulting public expenditures, of course, represent a 
temporal spillover.202 
 
196. See generally MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21201, LEAKING UNDERGROUND 
STORAGE TANKS (USTS): PREVENTION AND CLEANUP 4 (2010); Ronald W. Falta, The Potential for 
Ground Water Contamination by the Gasoline Lead Scavengers Ethylene Dibromide and 1,2-
Dichloroethane, GROUND WATER MONITORING & REMEDIATION, Aug. 2004, at 76. 
197. TIEMANN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 196, at 1.  
198. Legislation in 1984 added a chapter to Solid Waste Disposal Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
6991-6991i, to regulate underground storage tanks. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3277–87. In 1986, 
Congress also passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 521, 
100 Stat. 1613, 1774 which created the LUST (Leaking Underground Storage Tank) fund to help states 
pay when tank owners or operators cannot be found or made to pay for cleanup. 
199. TIEMANN, supra note 196, at 1. 
200. The fund was created by a 0.1 cent per gallon tax on retail sales of gasoline. Id. at 2. 
201. See CITY OF L.A. BROWNFIELD PROGRAM, GUIDE TO RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES AT ABANDONED AND UNDERUTILIZED GAS STATION SITES 4 (rev. 2013) (noting that tank 
removal costs range from $5,000–$10,000, but jump to the $50,000–$500,000 range when leaks have 
occurred). 
202. The magnitude of this spillover is not exactly clear, but a 2007 GAO report estimated 
remaining cleanup costs of around $12 billion nationwide. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
 











Today, most new underground tanks must be double-walled and 
equipped with sophisticated leak monitoring systems that diminish the 
likelihood of costly and toxic releases. 203  Extensive financial assurance 
requirements afford more thorough coverage for future problems than we 
have seen in the previous cases discussed in this Article.204 But cleaning up 
existing sites remains a significant policy challenge.205 With large industrial 
sites, the owner of record is well-known; if cleanup costs are passed to the 
public, it is because the owner has gone bankrupt or is otherwise unable or 
unwilling to pay for it. With smaller sites like gas stations, the situation is 
slightly different. Identifying the owner of record may itself be a costly and 
time-consuming task, and cities are not always able to accomplish it.206 In 
this setting, individual owners are sometimes able to abandon property in 
the conventional sense—that is, to walk away, relocate, and simply avoid 
the reach of legal authorities. 207 
C. Other Contaminated Sites  
Resource extraction sites and sites home to obsolete structures represent 
vast amounts of negative-value land, but land’s value can become negative 
also by way of contamination or other attributes that trigger legal 
obligations or liability. Soil and land contamination are serious and 
widespread problems; examples abound. When David Beckham sought to 
build a soccer stadium in Miami, the discovery of soil contaminants 
threatened $30–50 million in unanticipated cleanup costs.208 Michigan and 
other states are contending with an ongoing crisis involving PFAS, a long-
lived set of chemicals thought to endanger human health via both land and 
water contamination.209 Even outdoor shooting ranges—not exactly the first 
 
07-152, LEAKING UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS: EPA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO BETTER ENSURE THE 
EFFECTIVE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDING FOR CLEANUPS 4 (2007). 
203. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 280.20 (2019). 
204. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.90–.116. Current regulations require large operators to have per-
occurrence coverage of $1 million, 40 C.F.R. § 280.93(a)(1), and aggregate coverage of $2 million, 40 
C.F.R. § 280.93(b)(2). 
205. Despite the availability of public funds for cleanup, a backlog of some 100,000 sites remains. 
See TIEMANN, supra note 196, at summary. 
206. See CITY OF L.A BROWNFIELD PROGRAM, supra note 201, at 8–13. 
207. Id. at 4 (“In neighborhoods with high property values, the cost to remediate a site can come 
out of the purchase price or rental income. . . . In some cases, owners who cannot afford to remediate 
simply abandon the site.”). 
208. See Chris Marr, Soil Contamination Could Bend David Beckham’s Miami Soccer Plan, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 18, 2018, 4:24 PM) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/soil 
-contamination-could-bend-david-beckhams-miami-soccer-plan-1 [https://perma.cc/3H9X-369Y]. 
209. See Leonard N. Fleming, PFAS in Water Have Mich. Families Fearing Future, Pushing for 
Standards, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019, 12:40 PM) https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics 
/2019/03/21/pfas-families-school-federal-state-standard/3015338002/ [https://perma.cc/5DEV-XFNN]. 












thing to come to mind in this context—are associated with significant 
contamination.210  
The Love Canal crisis of the late 1970s focused national attention on the 
problem of land contamination and contributed to the enactment of 
CERCLA, the Superfund law.211  CERCLA creates an extensive web of 
liability whereby parties associated with the prior disposal of toxic waste 
may be compelled to share in the costs of remediation.212 The statute also 
levied a temporary tax on chemical and petroleum companies to create an 
enormous fund—the “Superfund”—to pay for cleanups conducted by the 
EPA, although cleanups (and lawsuits seeking contributions) can also be 
initiated by private parties. 213  CERCLA’s sweeping liability provisions 
have made parties understandably reluctant to acquire property that may be 
contaminated. Thus, “brownfield” properties, a common scourge especially 
in Rust Belt cities, often sit vacant and underutilized for years.214 
By subjecting those associated with contaminated property to retroactive 
liability—even for messes created by others—CERCLA “created” a good 
deal of negative-value property. Today, concerns about land contamination 
are ever-present in urban development. Merely estimating the cost of 
cleanup often requires expensive soil testing, so even parcels with minimal 
contamination are sometimes treated as negative-value and avoided by 
developers.215 Thorough environmental assessment is standard.216 Although 
some parcels will appreciate over time, public expenditures will likely 
remain a sizeable part of the story for the foreseeable future. 
CERCLA’s liability provisions serve not only to pay for the cleanup of 
existing sites, but also to deter improper waste disposal in the future.217 By 
 
210. See, e.g., A.O. Fayiga & U.K. Saha, Soil Pollution at Outdoor Shooting Ranges: Health 
Effects, Bioavailability and Best Management Practices, 216 ENV’T POLLUTION 135 (2016).  
211. CERCLA refers to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675. The 
Love Canal crisis involved a welter of public health problems in a small New York town, built atop an 
old landfill where chemical wastes had been deposited. See generally ADELINE GORDON LEVINE, LOVE 
CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE (1982). 
212. Liability under CERCLA is strict, joint, several, and retroactive, and applies to current and 
prior owners and operators, arrangers of disposal, or transporters of waste. See JAMES SALZMAN & 
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 253–55 (4th ed. 2014). 
213. Id. at 252–53. 
214. Id. at 261–62. 
215. See, e.g., David Slutzky & A.J. Frey, Brownfields Uncertainty: A Proposal to Reform 
Superfund, 12 CITYSCAPE, no. 3, 2010, 85. Noting that “[u]ncertainty is the enemy of economic activity,” 
the authors propose an absolute waiver of liability for “truly innocent private parties that undertake to 
redevelop brownfield sites.” Id. at 87. 
216. The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) establishes standards for 
Environmental Site Assessment (ESA). See ASTM E1527-13, E1901. 
217. See, e.g., Evan Bogart Westerfield, Comment, When Less is More: A Significant Risk 
Threshold for CERCLA Liability, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 711 n.87 (1993) (noting that deterrence is one 
of CERCLA’s “fundamental concerns”). 











extending liability to include even arrangers and transporters of waste, 
CERCLA gives numerous actors a vested interest in making certain that 
hazardous materials are contained and properly treated or disposed.218 Ex 
post liability, however, accomplishes its work by inducing firms to 
internalize the present value of expected expenditures in the future; that 
present value is discounted to the degree that firms expect to avoid cleanup 
costs.219 As we’ve seen already in other contexts, bankruptcy can allow 
firms to discharge environmental liabilities, and insurance coverage, even if 
required, may not adequately cover the costs of environmental 
remediation.220 Recent work by Sarah Light notes the extent to which, as a 
general matter, the law’s treatment of environmental obligations upon 
bankruptcy acts as a disincentive “for firms to comply in full with 
environmental obligations.”221 Light points out that the government’s own 
analysis, conducted by the GAO, concludes that taxpayer obligations for 
toxic waste liabilities discharged in bankruptcy could easily reach hundreds 
of billions of dollars.222 
D. Negative-Value Personal Property 
The problems posed by negative-value personal property are surprisingly 
similar to those raised by negative-value real property. As long as goods 
retain some positive value, owners are incentivized to preserve that value. 
Once an article has become negative in value, its owner is incentivized to 
dispose of it at the lowest cost—the lowest cost to the owner, that is.223 But 
 
218. Other laws also bear on land contamination, such as those that regulate landfills, pesticides, 
other toxic products, and so forth. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–
136y; Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601–2697. 
219. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1573 (noting that 
firms will finance future liabilities through insurance, bankruptcy, or both, depending on which system 
allows it to “pay less than its full liabilities”). 
220. Id. at 1586; see also Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 
STAN. L. REV. 137, 191 (2019) (contending that “bankruptcy law operates as a disincentive, not only to 
full compliance with public environmental law obligations, but also to environmentally positive 
behavior that goes beyond compliance with the law”); J. Ricky Arriola, Note, The Life & Times of a 
CERCLA Claim in Bankruptcy: An Examination of Hazardous Waste Liability in Bankruptcy 
Proceedings, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 55 (1993). 
221. Light, supra note 220, at 200. 
222. Id. at 192–93 (discussing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-658, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: EPA SHOULD DO MORE TO ENSURE THAT LIABLE PARTIES MEET THEIR 
CLEANUP OBLIGATIONS (2005)). Moreover, the EPA sometimes “fails to behave like a rational 
economic actor in pursuing its CERCLA claims.” Scott E. Blair, Note, Toxic Assets: The EPA’s 
Settlement of CERCLA Claims in Bankruptcy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1941, 1941 (2011). 
223. Recycling and compost programs struggle precisely because many people are unwilling to 













the method of waste disposal that costs the owner the least may foist costs 
onto the public.  
All waste, after all, must be somewhere. Although owners of personal 
property have the legal right to abandon it (unlike real property), Eduardo 
Peñalver has noted that one’s right to abandon personal property is qualified 
by the need to find a place to abandon it: all land in the United States must 
be “at least formally owned by someone.”224 Licit abandonment requires the 
consent of the receiving landowner, and parties rarely consent to receive 
trash or waste without some payment for doing so. That is precisely why 
illicit abandonment is so common. Illicit abandonment includes not only 
litter—an enormous policy hassle all its own, and one which imposes 
significant costs on society225—but also the less visible problem of illegal 
dumping. Large, unattended rural tracts make easy targets for the dumping 
of unwanted goods. At public parks and other public lands, for example, 
such dumping occurs with regrettable frequency. And there is no easy way 
to force offenders to bear the attendant costs. Deterrence policies focus not 
on recovering damages but on creating and enforcing criminal sanctions, 
supplemented perhaps by public information campaigns and other 
mechanisms of norm adjustment.226  
Public policy manages to channel a substantial amount of unwanted 
personal property into landfills or commercial waste processing facilities.227 
But these facilities take us right back to the now-familiar territory of 
negative-value real property. True, such a facility may be a positive-value 
asset to a profitable waste disposal firm. But waste facilities create 
incentives for owners that resemble those associated with mines or other 
resource extraction sites. Just as a mine generates revenue only while 
producing, a waste processor receives payment for accepting waste. From 
that point forward, both types of entity have an incentive to shirk cleanup 
responsibilities. The waste disposal industry is highly regulated; landfills 
and other disposal firms are required to comply with financial assurance 
 
224. Peñalver, supra note 16, at 203. Peñalver continues: “[t]he fact that all land is owned means 
that the owner of an item of personal property who wishes legally to abandon it must intentionally 
deposit the item on some piece of owned land . . . .” Id. 
225. Litter management is often addressed at the local level, and in many instances by volunteer 
contributions, but its aggregate costs are substantial. See generally KEEP AMERICA BEAUTIFUL, 2009 
NATIONAL VISIBLE LITTER SURVEY AND LITTER COST STUDY ES-1 (2009) (noting litter costs in the 
United States of roughly $11.5 billion annually). In recent years, a great deal of attention has also been 
devoted to the problem of marine litter, a massive problem which will require an international solution. 
See generally MARINE ANTHROPOGENIC LITTER (Melanie Bergmann, Lars Gutow & Michael Klages, 
eds., 2015). 
226. But see Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1233–34 (2001) (describing 
recycling as a “large-number, small-payoff” problem for which social norm management is an unlikely 
solution). 
227. See generally RAMESHA CHANDRAPPA & DIGANTA BHUSAN DAS, SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2012). 











requirements, along with stringent substantive requirements. 228  These 
entities have a vested interest—at least in theory—in pricing their services 
to reflect internalized costs. But what we cannot yet know is whether the 
law has adequately compelled these entities to internalize the actual, total 
costs of land maintenance by designing rules and setting financial assurance 
requirements appropriately.229 If not, landfills and waste processing plants 
may represent another target for future public expenditures. 
III. ANALYSIS  
Having completed this tour among various categories of negative-value 
property, we turn now towards analysis. The descriptions above, of 
negative-value property and the various policies enacted to contain related 
externalities, permit some general observations. 
A. There’s Much More to Come 
An important threshold observation simply has to do with the magnitude 
of the problem posed by negative-value property. It is far larger than most 
assessments would suggest. This is because, in nearly every policy category 
mentioned above, we remain in the opening stages of an unfolding situation. 
Of all the nuclear power plants that have ever operated in the United States, 
only a small number have entered decommissioning.230 Of all the oil and 
gas wells drilled in the United States, a relatively trivial fraction has been 
plugged.231 Of all the offshore drilling rigs on the continental shelf, only a 
few have been removed or disassembled.232 In these and other cases, the 
bulk of the work of cleanup or land reclamation lies ahead. The financial 
assurance and other policies that have been deployed to protect the public 
fisc might be regarded as experimental, and the experiment has only just 
begun. 
 
228. Solid waste disposal is regulated under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k. 
229. The EPA has expressed concern, for example, that solid waste disposal regulations could, if 
not designed properly, create “perverse incentives . . . to over-accumulate hazardous secondary materials 
without recycling them.” See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 862 F.3d 50, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal 
punctuation omitted) (discussing an EPA regulation defining “solid waste” under RCRA). 
230. “Worldwide we have almost no experience of dismantling power plants and burying 
radioactive waste. . . . In France not a single nuclear power plant has been completely decommissioned. 
. . . Worldwide less [sic] than twenty commercial reactors have been completely dismantled.” LÉVÊQUE, 
supra note 51, at 23. 
231. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Jim Malewitz, Abandoned Texas Oil Wells Seen as “Ticking 
Time Bombs” of Contamination, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.texastri 
bune.org/2016/12/21/texas-abandoned-oil-wells-seen-ticking-time-bombs-/ [https://perma.cc/SQ8N-9 
KGH] (quoting a local official as noting that “[t]here is about to be a tsunami of abandoned wells”). 












In a sense, the United States is facing a second wave of negative-value 
property. The first wave, perhaps best epitomized by the burst of resource 
exploitation that accompanied westward expansion across the North 
American continent, was characterized by the actual abandonment of 
damaged property. During this wave, the law could do little to bind owners 
to land or otherwise compel the remediation of exploited land. In many 
instances, the very process of establishing ownership, if invoked at all, could 
be terminated unilaterally.233 Thus miners simply packed up and moved 
elsewhere when their operations were no longer profitable. 234  Timber 
harvesters razed forests, decamped, and moved farther west.235 In effect, 
land abandonment was not only possible; it was often the norm.236 Although 
the externalities caused by this first wave of abandonment were small by 
today’s lights, the taxpaying public has absorbed almost entirely the costs 
of land restoration for this negative-value property because land users had 
disappeared off the scene long before the cumulative consequences of 
abandonment were understood. 237  Land law at the time had not yet 
addressed rehabilitation, and even if it had, enforcement capacity was 
minimal.238  
 
233. The public land laws that authorized the disposal of federal lands generally involved several 
stages. The initial stages secured a claimant’s status vis-à-vis other settlers, but the process could be 
abandoned before a patent issued. For example, the Homestead Act required five years of occupancy 
before vesting title in a settler; six months of nonoccupancy effected a forfeiture of the claim. Homestead 
Act of 1862, § 5, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, 393. Similarly, the General Mining Act of 1872 did not require 
prospectors to patent title before extracting minerals; to the contrary, an unpatented mining claim secured 
all rights necessary for commercial mining operations, and had the added benefit of avoiding state 
property taxes. General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872). These claims could be and 
often were abandoned without patent issuance. For general information regarding these laws’ operation 
and their widespread abuse, see REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LAND COMMISSION, H. EX. DOC. NO. 46-46 (2d 
Sess. 1880) (Serial No. 1923); see also PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 
(1968).  
234. These migrations are perhaps best captured by the literature describing the phenomenon of 
the “ghost town.” See generally MURIEL SIBELL WOLLE, THE BONANZA TRAIL: GHOST TOWNS AND 
THE MINING CAMPS OF THE WEST (1953); WOLLE, STAMPEDE TO TIMBERLINE: ABOUT COLORADO 
GHOST TOWNS (2d ed. 1974). “Historically the mining town developed when the ore was discovered 
and when the ore ran out, the town was abandoned. Many ghost towns attest to this course of events.” 
Robert E. Beck, Reclamation During and After Mining, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 333, 333 
(2004). 
235. See generally JOHN ISE, THE UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY (1920). Ise’s classic work 
focuses predominantly on the abuse of the federal land laws around the turn of the last century, but it 
also addresses the waste of timber and land associated with large-scale timber harvest before the industry 
became serious about reforestation. See, e.g., id. at 359–77. 
236. For example, one California land register estimated that approximately two-thirds of filings 
in his office were not consummated. REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LAND COMMISSION, supra note 233, at 23. 
See also Struhsaker, supra note 57 (describing a pattern of land abandonment in Michigan). 
237. Legislation to address abandoned hardrock mines, for example, did not appear until the late 
1900s. See generally Stokstad, supra note 149. 
238. See generally GATES, supra note 233 (note especially the vast difference in administrative 
capacity between, e.g., Chapters 15-17, covering the mid to late nineteenth century, and Chapter 20-21, 
covering the early to mid twentieth century).  











The second wave, by contrast, is characterized by the functional 
abandonment of negative-value property, and the property at issue is vastly 
greater in the magnitude of its temporal externalities. Massive dams; nuclear 
power plants; mines a mile wide and a mile deep; oil and gas fields whose 
wellbores extend thousands of feet underground—titanic projects of this 
sort, impossible only a century ago, are now reaching the ends of their 
lifespans and require attention. In each of these contexts, we have seen that 
there is ample cause for concern about temporal externalities. Even if 
owners are unable to terminate ownership unilaterally, bonding and 
bankruptcy processes often enable the functional abandonment of degraded 
property. There is profound uncertainty about what additional cleanup costs 
may yet arise in these contexts, and current law functionally allows owners 
to divert such costs to the general public.  
B. Property and Time 
Owners of negative-value property commonly seek to defer expenditures 
associated with remediation. In part, this is because of the possibility what 
is now considered waste might one day have economic value. Coalbed 
methane, once considered a dangerous and unwanted byproduct of coal 
mining, was later recognized as a valuable fuel source in its own right.239 
Tailings, the material left behind after the desired substances have been 
extracted from a mine, have themselves been “mined” for other substances 
as market conditions allow.240 And markets for recycled goods have brought 
economic value to certain streams of what would otherwise be household 
waste. An owner of negative-value property, therefore, may in some 
instances elect to delay cleanup or remediation as a form of speculation, 
gambling that future gains will reduce or eliminate the loss associated with 
immediate cleanup. Perhaps the same land attributes that are now 
considered a liability might one day be considered an asset. Or perhaps the 
land’s other characteristics—its location, for example—might enhance the 
tract’s positive values until they one day exceed the costs of contamination, 
restoring the land’s market appeal. In other words, in this view, the 
opportunity costs associated with immediate cleanup are unacceptably high. 
A landowner may also choose to delay land remediation because she 
believes that the cost of cleanup is likely to decrease over time. One reason 
simply has to do with the time value of money: a rational actor would prefer 
 
239. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874–78 (1999) (noting the changing 
value of coalbed methane in the context of the proper interpretation of federal reservations of “coal” in 
land grant statutes).  
240. See Alan Farnahm, Old Mine Tailings: New Mother Lode for Rare Elements, ABCNEWS 
(July 24, 2013, 7:29 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/rare-earth-elements-mine-tailings/story?id 












to spend a dollar in the future than a dollar now. Discussions about nuclear 
decommissioning regularly invoke this idea to downplay the present 
estimates of decommissioning costs.241 But the cost of cleanup may also 
decline due to technological development and innovation. There may in the 
future be cleanup techniques or machinery that are able to accomplish the 
job more cheaply, more effectively, or both. Of course, cleanup costs could 
also rise: additional harms could be discovered or the extent of existing 
harm better understood, or the standards for cleanup could become more 
stringent. Nonetheless, a landowner could easily conclude that this risk is 
worth taking. 
These reasons for delay are legitimate. But owners may also elect to 
delay cleanup or remediation simply because they wish to shirk their 
cleanup responsibilities. And in such instances, owners can draw upon the 
rationales just rehearsed to argue that immediate remediation is imprudent, 
making it difficult for regulators to distinguish between sound business 
practices and mere manipulation. For example, an oil well that is no longer 
producing in profitable quantities must, at some point, be plugged and 
decommissioned in accordance with state requirements.242 The plugging 
process can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.243 Well owners, happy to 
defer this expense, may simply neglect to notify the relevant authority of 
the well’s inactivity. 244  Alternatively, operators may keep a well in 
operation even though its production is miniscule.245 In either case, a delay 
in well closure increases the likelihood that the well operator will become 
insolvent before plugging, at which point the well will likely become the 
ward of the state. 
From a policy standpoint, this aspect of delay—and shifting land values 
more generally—complicates the law of cleanup or land remediation. While 
owners might prefer to postpone cleanup, policy makers may fear that land 
harms will spread, that contamination may extend to neighboring parcels, 
that groundwater might become tainted, and so forth. They may also fear 
that unresolved land harms will cause land values to decline in the vicinity 
of the site. And they may recognize that the passage of time increases the 
likelihood of insolvency. These factors place lawmakers and regulators in a 
difficult position: if they allow landowners to delay remediation, they may 
 
241. See LÉVÊQUE, supra note 51, at 23–34. 
242. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra note 127. 
244. Trey Scott, Railroad Commission Adopts Rule Changes Affecting Inactive Wells, 16 TEX. 
LAND & MIN. OWNERS ASS’N OFF. NEWSL., no. 4, 2016, at 4 (discussing the practice of keeping 
declining wells in active status).  
245. This also occurs when mineral lessees wish to keep a lease alive: a single producing well can 
perpetuate a lease of even a very large tract. See James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law, 
95 IND. L.J. 389, 403–04 (2020). 











expose the public to greater danger and expense. But if they choose 
stringency and require prompt cleanup, they may foreclose genuine 
opportunities for land improvement, impose unnecessary costs on business, 
and incur political opposition. 
C. Hiding in Plain Sight: Property Value and Scale 
Another important aspect of the problem of negative-value property 
arises from the fact that real property values depend, by definition, on the 
boundaries of the units at issue. The market value of any piece of property 
is wholly contingent upon the definition or delineation of the property right. 
Change the parameters of the right, change the value of the property. An 
urban parcel contaminated by highly toxic chemicals, negative-value by 
itself, could be joined to adjacent parcels to form a positive-value unit. 
Conversely, large properties with positive market value might contain 
negative-value portions. An oil well in need of plugging may be negative-
value if severed from surrounding land, but if its tract also contains many 
productive wells, the negative value attributable to the defunct well may 
scarcely be of note.  
Whether real property appears to the marketplace as positive-value or 
negative-value, then, often turns on the scale of its negative-value 
characteristics relative to the entirety of the property. This simple 
observation implies that there is a good deal more unwanted or liability-
laden property than meets the eye: it is hiding in plain sight, attached to or 
subsumed within positive-value property. If existing lot lines and 
boundaries could be redrawn—say, if owners could freely sever and 
abandon undesirable portions of their property—a great deal of negative-
value property, presently contained within larger tracts with a clear positive 
value, would be exposed. Of course, owners cannot unilaterally redraw 
boundaries, and portions of land cannot easily be abandoned. We might 
infer, in fact, that one way to contend with negative-value property is to 
keep it bundled or batched with positive-value property such that the owner 
of the bundle acquires an interest in remediating the negative-value 
condition. More about this possibility in Section IV.D. 
The key point here is that the relationship between scale and value is 
thoroughgoing and essential. In part, this is old news. Property scholars have 
long recognized that the scale at which property units are legally delineated 
matters a great deal.246 It matters because externalities arise when there is a 
mismatch between parcel size and the effects of a particular land use—as 
 
246. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 












when, for example, noxious odors emanate from one parcel into neighboring 
ones. 247  Another mismatch arises when resource systems extend across 
numerous parcels, such that efforts to manage the system confront a serious 
collective action problem.248  Land demarcation regimes impose a blunt 
homogeneity atop these concerns: even though any given scheme of surface 
ownership may make sense under the circumstances of its origin, serious 
frustrations and inefficiencies can arise when established boundaries no 
longer suit the land management issues of the moment.249 
One way that American law has responded to this set of problems is by 
allowing the fragmentation of land ownership. The fundamental land unit 
remains the tract, demarcated on the land’s surface, and held in fee simple. 
But the law permits owners to fragment their interests in various ways 
across space, time, and even substance.250 An owner could, for example, 
lease the oil beneath his land to X for ten years, sell the rights to natural gas 
in fee simple to Y, and convey the surface rights of the same land to Z for 
life, with the result that the original owner, X, Y, and Z would each presently 
own a legally-enforceable interest in the same property.251 Some scholars 
extol this divisibility as an efficiency-enhancing virtue of the flexible 
system of American property law.252 Thus oil and gas firms, for example, 
can pool the oil and gas rights of multiple owners in order to allow the 
efficient extraction of the hydrocarbons owned by the members of the pool, 
while these owners continue to make individualized use of the surface 
above.253  
But the negative-value property problem adds a twist to this optimistic 
account because fragmented rights can be more easily abandoned than full-
fledged land ownership. Consider the situation of abandoned oil and gas 
wells. In most instances, landowners do not themselves drill or operate 
wells, but instead sell or lease their oil or gas rights to firms. Although most 
 
247. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1323–1335. 
248. See, e.g., Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscale-
Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015). The nature of the collective action problem depends 
upon the characteristics of the resource, the resource users, and so forth. See generally Elinor Ostrom, 
Analyzing Collective Action, 41 AGRIC. ECON. 155 (2010). 
249. See Schulz & Lueck, supra note 248, at 2520–22 (describing Congress’s shift from 
prioritizing privatization of western lands to conservation). 
250. See Daniel B. Kelly, Dividing Possessory Rights, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 
175 (Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2015). 
251. The original owner’s interest, of course, would be a future interest—a reversion—but as 
every first-year law student learns, future interests are presently existing even if not currently possessory. 
252. Kelly, supra note 250. Professor Kelly argues that “under most circumstances, private 
owners will not have an incentive to divide their property excessively,” id. at 176, but acknowledges 
that “unlike private owners, public officials do not necessarily internalize the economic costs and 
benefits of dividing possessory rights,” id. at 189.  
253. See generally JOHN S. LOWE, OWEN L. ANDERSON, ERNEST E. SMITH, DAVID E. PIERCE, 
CHRISTOPHER S. KULANDER & MONIKA U. EHRMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 
226–304 (7th ed. 2018). 











states track mineral ownership, absentee mineral ownership is common, and 
mineral rights may change hands without the surface owner’s knowledge.254 
If a producer encounters financial difficulties, even a vigilant surface owner 
may not know about it, even though that owner is likely to be the party most 
affected by an abandoned well. If an aggrieved landowner wishes to plug an 
abandoned well rather than wait for a state agency to do it, the state’s 
reimbursement may be incomplete. 255  To be clear, the law does not 
countenance the abandonment of oil and gas interests. But enforcement is 
difficult, and whereas the abandonment of land would at least allow for the 
seizure of the abandoned parcel, the abandonment of mineral rights 
ordinarily leaves no offsetting, recoverable positive-value asset.256  
Another version of this dynamic is visible on the federal public lands, 
where fragmented land interests are everywhere.257 Public lands law invites 
private parties to secure rights in lands—rights to timber, to minerals, and 
so forth—while retaining residual ownership in the United States.258 Once 
those rights are exhausted or terminated, federal agencies are often left to 
bear some or all of the cost of cleanup, either because the law does not 
require full reclamation, or because of failures in law enforcement.259  
Residual losses of this sort are not inevitable: the law could specify 
precisely the duties of public lands claimants, enforce those duties 
diligently, and impose penalties for noncompliance. Certain private firms, 
such as landlords and car rental firms, trade in divided property rights as a 
matter of course; their viability suggests that it is possible to contain the 
resulting temporal spillovers.260 But public land managers are not running a 
 
254. For a description of the challenges of tracking mineral ownership, see, for example, Sara K. 
Sorenson, A Need for Clarification: North Dakota’s Abandoned Mineral Statute, 86 N.D. L. REV. 521 
(2010). See also Robert W. Roll, Wards of the State: Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells in Texas, DALLAS 
BAR ASS’N HEADNOTES, Aug. 2017, at 19 (noting that “[p]lugging is never the royalty owner’s 
obligation. Of course, this is little consolation if an abandoned well is left behind with no one around to 
plug it.”) 
255. See, e.g., Roll, supra note 254. (noting that the Texas Railroad Commission will reimburse a 
maximum of fifty percent of the costs of plugging, if carried out by the surface owner). 
256. The state oversight agency may place a lien on well site equipment, id., but this may be of 
little to no value.  
257. See generally Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private 
Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 9–19 (1987). 
258. The proliferation of private interests on public lands created, in the words of the Supreme 
Court, “virtual chaos with respect to the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that more than 6 million 
unpatented mining claims existed on public lands other than the national forests . . . .” United States v. 
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 86–87 (1985). 
259. See U.S. GAO, supra note 132 (describing the costs to government associated with 
reclaiming abandoned well sites). Note too that the federal government may be liable under CERCLA 
merely as an owner of land contaminated by hazardous substances. See Chevron Mining Inc. v. United 
States, 863 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2017).  
260. Drivers tend to treat rental cars with less care than vehicles they own, for example, yet well-













business. The price that a mining company pays to mine on public lands, for 
example, is as much the product of politics as the logic of the bottom line.261 
Unlike the landlord or the rental car company, lawmakers have little 
incentive—and certainly no existential business need—to establish resource 
leasing and development policies that achieve a profit. At no stage of public 
lands law have lawmakers accurately priced the harms caused by resource 
development. 262  There is no doubt that the public lands have fueled 
American economic growth, both literally and metaphorically.263  Public 
lands law has generously encouraged resource development, richly 
rewarded those who engage in it, and effectively immunized them from 
subsequent liabilities. 264  But the remaindermen—the public and its 
representative officials—have paid a steep price.265  
D. The Way Forward 
So where does this leave us? With the foregoing observations in mind, 
what might we say about how better to address temporal spillovers and 
negative-value property?  
As to policy, our findings thus far suggest that negative-value property 
is a sizeable problem in numerous economic sectors. Existing policy tools, 
if calibrated and implemented property, could substantially reduce the 
incidence and magnitude of the resulting temporal spillovers. There is no 
technical reason why financial assurance policies cannot effectively address 
the bulk of land remediation. The failures of such policies thus far have 
 
for Used Automobiles, 23 REV. INDUS. ORG. 65 (2003) (finding that fleet vehicles depreciate more 
rapidly than owner-driven vehicles, in part due to moral hazard). Similarly, a delinquent tenant in a 
rented apartment, for example, can cause damage in excess of a security deposit, leaving the landlord to 
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261. For more about the pricing of natural resource assets, see Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market 
Value of Public Resources, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1515 (2015). 
262. Id. 
263. See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SALES OF FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCED FROM 
FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS, FY 2003 THROUGH FY 2014 (2015). This publication provides historical 
production data regarding fuels sold from federal land use. During the reported period, the share of U.S. 
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264. See generally ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC 
LAND LAW IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2006). 
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LIABILITY (2019) (total cleanup liability of Department of Energy alone reaches nearly $400 billion); 
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Commerce’s Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy and estimating a total cleanup liability 
of nearly $359 billion on sites managed by the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Defense, and 
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stemmed less from policy structure than from policy implementation.266 If 
the cost of cleanup is properly assessed, if bond or assurance coverage is 
sufficient to cover such costs, and if regulators supervise the process 
adequately, then financial assurance policies can reliably provide for the 
cleanup of most degraded sites and spare the public the costs of temporal 
spillovers.267 
At the same time, these are big “ifs.” The same incentives that might lead 
owners to abandon property can also mobilize these owners in the political 
realm. The possibility of abandonment, and the likelihood of the resulting 
temporal spillovers, have long been known to lawmakers in jurisdictions 
where coal, oil, gas, and other extractive industries operate, but political 
pressures often prevent these lawmakers from creating effective policies 
and empowering agencies to implement them. It goes without saying that 
many regulated firms will resist both the imposition and the enforcement of 
stringent reclamation policies. What might be less obvious, however, are 
the political dynamics among those parties that might most plausibly oppose 
the regulated community. Some of the very parties that stand to suffer the 
most direct losses due to negative-value property—owners of adjacent land 
or surface title above mineral claims—are unlikely to support strict 
remediation rules at the front end of a resource boom. Quite the contrary: 
such owners will, in all likelihood, be eager to cash in on lucrative resource 
deposits and to benefit from economic activity. As such, they tend to oppose 
regulatory safeguards and instead stand shoulder-to-shoulder with 
producers and developers as the rules of remediation are being written even 
 
266. And in some industries, financial assurance requirements simply have gone untried. 
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to impose financial assurance requirements on industry segments to cover 
the costs of releases of hazardous substances, but the agency has never exercised this authority. See 
CERCLA § 108(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b); see also In re Idaho Conservation League, 811 F.3d 502, 506 
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the Trump EPA decided not to issue the final rule. Financial Responsibility Requirements Under 
CERCLA Section 108(b) for Classes of Facilities in the Hardrock Mining Industry, 83 Fed. Reg. 7556, 
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though, once the boom has ended, those same landowners may well find 
themselves adversely affected by nearby negative-value property.  
Our earlier observations about time and delay (Section IV.B) suggest 
further that owners may be unwilling to acknowledge the need for cleanup 
until it is too late, and that regulators will have a difficult time distinguishing 
between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for delay.268  These political 
forces are unsurprising and we should expect them to persist until 
countervailing political pressures come to the fore—something that would 
presumably require, among other things, a much greater awareness of the 
problem on the part of the taxpaying public, and a corresponding 
willingness on the part of voters to hold lawmakers accountable for weak 
and ineffective financial assurance policies. 
So a first step towards better policy on negative-value property would be 
to simply deliver on the promise of existing financial assurance strategies in 
the face of certain political opposition. But given the foregoing observations 
regarding scale (Section IV.C), there is another strategy that has perhaps 
received inadequate attention in the literature. This is the idea of bundling. 
Ownership ordinarily bundles together desirable qualities with aversive 
ones.269 Negative-value problem becomes a social problem when a parcel’s 
aversive aspects—and specifically remediation costs—exceed its expected 
post-remediation value, leading to abandonment. But a parcel’s value is 
entirely a function of its particular demarcation: as we have said, a great 
deal of negative-value property is “hiding” within positive-value property. 
This suggests that another approach to negative-value parcels might be to 
bundle them with positive-value parcels—in essence, to curb an owner’s 
incentive to abandon a newly-defined bundle of property. 
Some real estate transactions already employ a form of this approach. 
Brownfield specialists note that distressed properties are sometimes sold as 
a batch, and may be marketable notwithstanding the inclusion of negative-
value properties, if the positive-value properties offset the costs of 
remediation. 270  Firms willingly remediate negative-value brownfield 
properties that would be unprofitable alone if doing so is the price of 
acquiring more desirable tracts elsewhere. 271  Bundling of this sort is 
artificial in that it involves not a physical connection with adjacent land, but 
a legal connection with parcels elsewhere. Nonetheless, regulators might 
 
268. Moreover, because the externalities of greatest concern are temporal rather than spatial, the 
constituency most likely to bear the costs of abandoned negative-value property is a future one. 
Politicians themselves serve time-limited terms of office, such that the time-horizon of their decision-
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269. See Fennell, supra note 8, at 1316. 
270. Interview with real estate attorney (Nov. 9, 2018) (on file with the author). 
271. If such deals emerge out of bankruptcy proceedings, there is still a temporal spillover: the 
acquiring firm (rather than the general public) is paying for cleanup costs shirked by the previous owner. 











employ this approach more widely, conditioning future opportunities on the 
remediation of old sites. 
Bundling of a different form could also be employed on public lands. As 
noted earlier, public land law presently relies a great deal on fragmented 
interests—mining claims, timber contracts, and so forth, on lands which 
otherwise remain titled in the federal government. Although environmental 
organizations typically oppose the divestiture of public lands, in limited 
circumstances an outright sale of land may provide greater incentives for 
extractive industries to conserve land for the long-term than would the 
current scheme of limited use rights. By preserving land as a complete 
“bundle,” land management agencies would eliminate the disjoint of 
incentives that otherwise enables resource development interests to 
disregard the long-term health of the land. 
By this point, some readers may be disappointed by the “ways forward” 
explicated here. In this disappointment lies an important lesson about 
property. The problem of negative-value property is simply part and parcel 
of our property system, and all the more so in an age in which lasting 
damage to land can be imposed in the blink of an eye. Sparing other owners 
the costs of such damage requires a social system that can anticipate it and 
extract compensation (or some reliable guaranty thereof) ex ante. Systems 
of that sort are difficult to organize and maintain, and American property 
law gets us only partway there.  
CONCLUSION 
The core social functions of property are bound up in the protection of 
ownership.272 Property law links the welfare of the owner with his or her 
stewardship of the owned thing: ownership of something, vouchsafed by the 
state, often provides an incentive to conserve and protect it.273 This simple 
logic is the foundation for fundamental approaches to resource access, 
allocation, management, and governance.274 Understandably, then, many 
 
272. See Demsetz, supra note 4, at 356 (“[P]rivate ownership of land will internalize many of the 
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regard property rights as a road to conservation, a road built on a bed of 
individual decisions rather than a heavy-handed state.  
But negative-value property upsets this picture. In predictable instances, 
the incentive to conserve is replaced by the incentive to exploit and to 
abandon. When land contains valuable resources such as oil, coal, timber, 
or minerals, any incentive to protect such land for the future may be dwarfed 
by the incentive to market the resource. Similarly, as industrial facilities age 
and deteriorate, owners may find it more economical to mothball or abandon 
them than to dismantle or decontaminate them. In each of these instances, 
owners’ incentives cut against the protection of property, and avoiding 
temporal spillovers and public expenditure will require affirmative 
governmental effort.  
It is neither possible nor desirable to do away with all externalities, for 
the cost would far exceed the benefits. To simply identify a persistent and 
generally unnoticed area of externalized costs, as this article has done, is to 
highlight the costs borne by the public due to the delinquency of property 
owners in particular circumstances. But whatever the feasibility of reducing 
the public cost of negative-value property, the existence and abundance of 
such property exposes the tradeoffs embedded in certain pillars of American 
property law. The flexibility of property fragmentation, the long tradition of 
public land ownership, and the relaxed approach to land use that typify the 
American system all take on a different cast in light of the imposing burden 
of negative-value property. Negative-value property is not some aberration, 
an idiosyncratic problem that will disappear of its own: it is endemic to our 
system of landownership, and its prevalence demonstrates that a more 
thoroughgoing approach to conservation must look beyond the law of 
property. 
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